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Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\" \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation ac...\n\nTags: latest:1.0.6\n\nVersion history:\n\nv1.0.6 | 2026-07-16T17:52:44.547Z | user\n\nDescription tail link + agents machine-readable metadata line (deciqai.com/s/bcg-matrix.json)\n\nv1.0.5 | 2026-07-09T11:15:42.623Z | user\n\nRefresh: 2024-2026 AI-era worked examples added (strategy/leadership + systems/game-theory batch)\n\nv1.0.4 | 2026-07-08T10:54:41.341Z | user\n\nFooter now uses /c/ short link (fixes UTM truncation when SKILL.md is read in a terminal)\n\nv1.0.3 | 2026-07-08T03:50:50.174Z | user\n\nSecond primary-sourced worked example\n\nv1.0.2 | 2026-07-08T00:39:07.409Z | user\n\nRefreshed content + GitHub star link in footer\n\nv1.0.1 | 2026-07-07T20:30:02.776Z | user\n\nAdd catalog categories and topics\n\nv1.0.0 | 2026-06-26T07:17:23.194Z | user\n\nInitial publish\n\nArchive index:\n\nArchive v1.0.6: 7 files, 15087 bytes\n\nFiles: examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md (4448b), examples/microsoft-ai-capital-reallocation-portfolio-2024-2026.md (8177b), examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md (2024b), references/sources.md (2420b), skill-card.md (2819b), SKILL.md (8798b), _meta.json (129b)\n\nFile v1.0.6:SKILL.md\n\n---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n More: deciqai.com/c/bcg-matrix\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: `porters-five-forces` to define industry boundary first · `swot-analysis` for internal-capability depth · `ansoff-matrix` to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n- **AI capital reallocation:** deciding which units to harvest to fund AI capex / AI-native bets, and whether an AI unit is a true Star or an expensive Question Mark amid AI-native competition\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self-sufficiency].\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n\n## The Process\n\nProduce a **Portfolio Map** — quadrant assignments, trend arrows, and resource-allocation recommendations per SBU.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Must: serve an identifiable customer group, have identifiable competitors, be manageable with resource independence. Stop rule: if you cannot name the primary competitor, the boundary is wrong.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate.** 2–3 years external data; calculate CAGR. Dividing line: **10%** (raise to 20–30% for AI/clean-tech). Never use own revenue growth as a proxy.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share.** Own share ÷ largest competitor's share. >1.0 = leader; <1.0 = follower.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot.** X-axis: relative share (log, right = high); Y-axis: growth (linear, up = high); bubble size = revenue. Assign quadrant.\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows.** 2-year trajectory per SBU. Trend often matters more than current position.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy.** Star: invest aggressively. Cash Cow: extract surplus; minimize capex. Question Mark: binary — upgrade to Star OR exit by a named date. Dog: harvest/exit; hold only if synergy is named and quantified.\n\n### Output Template\n\n```\nBCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: \n```\n\n*→ Method in Action: [Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md) · [GE's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Pruning (1981–1995)](examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md)*\n*→ 2026 lens: [Microsoft's Portfolio as AI Reallocates Capital (2024–2026)](examples/microsoft-ai-capital-reallocation-portfolio-2024-2026.md) — which units are Stars, which Cash Cows fund the AI capex build, which are Question Marks or Dogs*\n\n## Portfolio Packs\n\n| Industry | Share proxy | Growth proxy | Dog trap | Star misread |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Consumer packaged goods | Nielsen/IRI retail share | Category CAGR | Legacy brand in declining format | Tiny-base subcategory inflating growth rate |\n| Enterprise SaaS | ARR share vs. ICP rivals | Gartner/IDC forecast | Feature-complete product commoditizing | VC competitor's discount-driven \"growth\" |\n| AI products (2024+) | Monthly active API users vs. nearest rival | Segment TAM growth | Model-wrapper with no defensible moat | Benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path |\n| Retail/e-commerce | GMV share | Segment GMV CAGR | Category with free platform substitute | High-growth vertical with dominant incumbent |\n\n*→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)*\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n**[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.**\n\n| Fake move | Reality |\n|---|---|\n| [D] Using absolute share instead of relative share | A 25%-share firm facing a 40% rival is a follower. Absolute share hides competitive position. |\n| [D] Defining market too broadly to manufacture high relative share | Calling a niche player in \"enterprise software\" a leader obscures the actual threat. |\n| [D] Labeling every Dog as \"strategic\" to avoid exit | Synergy must be quantifiable — name the mechanism and the dollar amount. |\n| [D] Treating the matrix as a one-time exercise | Growth rates and positions shift. Refresh annually at minimum. |\n| [D] Assuming every Question Mark deserves investment | Correct default is a defined decision deadline. Most Question Marks should be exited. |\n| [D] Using BCG to justify a decision already made | If unit definitions are chosen after quadrant destinations are known, the analysis is reverse-engineered. |\n| [D] Applying experience-curve assumption to software or platforms | High share does not mechanically produce low costs in knowledge-intensive businesses. |\n| [D] Treating all Cash Cows as permanent | Cows can become Dogs. Maintain a deterioration watch with leading indicators. |\n| *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Market boundary defined after desired quadrant assignment is known · relative share uses own revenue not competitor's share · all Question Marks described as \"likely Stars\" with no exit criteria · no trend arrows · Dogs retained with unquantified synergy · Cash Cows don't cover Stars + Question Mark investment needs · matrix used as a slide with no reallocation following\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Each SBU passes the standalone-manager test (identifiable market, rivals, separable P&L)\n- [ ] Relative share = own share ÷ largest competitor's share (not absolute share)\n- [ ] Market growth from external data, not own revenue growth\n- [ ] 2-year trend arrows plotted for each SBU\n- [ ] Cash Cow generation quantified against Star + Question Mark investment needs\n- [ ] Each Dog has an exit plan or a named, quantified synergy\n- [ ] Each Question Mark has a decision deadline with invest-or-exit criteria\n- [ ] Refresh cadence scheduled (state the date)\n\n---\n\n*Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — 227 open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. The same skills power every deciqAI agent, which runs them autonomously to operate your company. **See it run → https://www.deciqai.com/c/bcg-matrix** · ⭐ Star the repo → https://github.com/deciqAI/knowledge-skills · Contributions welcome.*\n\n*Agents: latest version & machine-readable metadata → https://www.deciqai.com/s/bcg-matrix.json*\n\nFile v1.0.6:_meta.json\n\n{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.6\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1784224364547\n}\n\nFile v1.0.6:references/sources.md\n\n# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n- Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. Primary source for the GE worked example — the #1-or-#2 \"fix, sell, or close\" rule, the three-circles framework, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition.\n- Microsoft Corporation. Forms 10-K (FY2024, FY2025) and quarterly earnings releases. Primary source for the 2024–2026 AI-capital-reallocation example — three-segment structure (Productivity & Business Processes, Intelligent Cloud, More Personal Computing), Azure growth, and AI capital-expenditure guidance. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor\n- Cloud-infrastructure market-share and growth trackers (e.g., Synergy Research Group, Canalys) as reported through 2025. Context for the relative-share axis (AWS leader, Azure #2, Google Cloud follower) in the Microsoft example. Used as directional market-share context, not as precise-figure evidence.\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here.\n\nFile v1.0.6:examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md\n\n# Method in Action: General Electric's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Portfolio Pruning (1981–1995)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nWhen Jack Welch became CEO in April 1981, General Electric was the archetypal diversified conglomerate: dozens of strategic business units — a structure GE itself had pioneered in its 1970 reorganization — spanning lighting, appliances, motors, power systems, aerospace, mining, housewares, and consumer electronics. The company was profitable in aggregate, but shared capital was spread across hundreds of product lines regardless of competitive position. Welch's response was an operational enactment of growth-share portfolio logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** GE's existing SBU structure already passed the standalone-manager test — each unit had an identifiable market, named competitors, and a separable P&L. This made the portfolio immediately mappable.\n\n**Steps 2–3 — The two axes, collapsed into a rule:** Welch compressed the matrix's two dimensions into a single test. The relative-share axis became the famous rule that every business must be **#1 or #2 in its market** — leadership in Henderson's relative-share sense — or be fixed, sold, or closed. The growth axis became his \"three circles\" sketch of 1983: only businesses inside the circles of **core manufacturing, technology, and services** — the sectors GE judged to have structural growth or defensible economics — earned a claim on capital. A business outside the circles with a follower share was, in matrix terms, a Dog.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Quadrant actions and cash rebalancing:**\n\n- **Dogs and weak Question Marks — exit.** GE sold the housewares business to Black & Decker (1984), divested Utah International's mining operations (1984), exited air conditioning, and in 1987 traded its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France in exchange for Thomson's medical-imaging business — swapping a follower position in a brutal market for added share in a business where GE led. Headcount fell by well over 100,000 during the 1980s through divestiture and restructuring, earning Welch the \"Neutron Jack\" nickname.\n- **Cash Cows — harvest.** Mature leaders such as lighting, motors, and major appliances were run for cash with disciplined capital expenditure rather than growth investment.\n- **Stars and promoted Question Marks — invest.** Divestiture proceeds and Cash Cow surplus funded aggressive investment in GE Capital, medical systems, and plastics, and financed the $6.3 billion acquisition of RCA (1986), which brought NBC into the portfolio.\n\n**Validation:** GE's market capitalization grew from roughly $13 billion in 1981 to over $400 billion by Welch's retirement in 2001 — for a period, the most valuable company in the world.\n\n**The built-in critique (1995):** The case also documents the matrix's classic failure mode. Welch recounts in his memoir that by the mid-1990s, managers had learned to game the #1-or-#2 rule by defining their markets narrowly enough to claim leadership — exactly the rationalization this skill flags as \"defining the market to manufacture high relative share.\" Prompted by a critique surfaced in a Crotonville management class, Welch inverted the discipline: businesses were ordered to redefine their markets so broadly that their share fell **below 10%**, forcing them to see growth headroom the old rule had hidden. The map is only as honest as the market boundary.\n\nThe mapped steps:\n1. Define SBUs: GE's pre-existing SBU structure — identifiable markets, competitors, separable P&Ls\n2. Growth screen: the \"three circles\" (core, technology, services) as the high-growth / structurally attractive test\n3. Relative share: the #1-or-#2 rule as an operational proxy for relative market share > 1.0\n4. Plot and assign: businesses outside the circles with follower share treated as Dogs\n5. Rebalance cash: divestiture proceeds plus Cash Cow surplus redirected to GE Capital, medical systems, and RCA/NBC\n6. Refresh and self-correct: the 1995 market-redefinition order fixed the narrow-boundary gaming the rule had created\n\nPrimary source: Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. The #1-or-#2 rule, the three-circles framework, the major divestitures and the RCA acquisition, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition are all recounted there and in GE annual reports of the period.\n\nFile v1.0.6:examples/microsoft-ai-capital-reallocation-portfolio-2024-2026.md\n\n# Method in Action: Microsoft's Product Portfolio as AI Reallocates Capital (2024–2026)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nBy 2024–2026, Microsoft had become the clearest large-cap case of a diversified technology portfolio being re-mapped by the AI capital cycle. The strategic question was not \"are we in AI\" but a portfolio question the growth-share matrix is built for: **which mature units throw off enough cash to fund a historically large AI capex build-out, which AI bets are genuine Stars versus expensive Question Marks, and which legacy units are quietly slipping toward Dog status.** This example applies the skill's process to Microsoft's reported segment structure as of early 2026. Figures are drawn from Microsoft's public segment reporting and widely-reported disclosures; where an exact number is uncertain it is qualified or omitted.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Microsoft reports three segments, each passing the standalone-manager test (identifiable customers, named rivals, separable P&L):\n- **Productivity & Business Processes** — Microsoft 365 / Office, Copilot for M365, LinkedIn, Dynamics. Rivals: Google Workspace, Salesforce.\n- **Intelligent Cloud** — Azure and server products. Rival: AWS (leader), Google Cloud (follower).\n- **More Personal Computing** — Windows, devices (Surface), search/advertising (Bing), and gaming (Xbox / Activision Blizzard). Rivals vary by line: Apple, Sony/Nintendo, Google.\n\nFor AI-specific reads we also treat **Azure AI / Copilot** as an emerging unit-within-a-unit, because it is where the capital and the competitive fight are concentrated.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate (threshold raised to ~20% for cloud/AI).** Following the skill's rule to raise the dividing line for AI-adjacent markets: public cloud infrastructure was reported growing at roughly 20%-or-more annually through this period, and the generative-AI segment faster off a smaller base. Mature PC software (Windows, Office seat growth) and console gaming grew in the low single digits — clearly *below* the line. Never use Microsoft's own revenue growth as the proxy; the axis is external market CAGR.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share (own share ÷ largest rival's share).**\n- **Azure:** the reported #2 in cloud infrastructure behind AWS, so relative share is **below 1.0** — a follower that had been reported gaining share.\n- **Microsoft 365 / Office:** dominant in paid enterprise productivity, relative share **well above 1.0** — a leader.\n- **Windows:** dominant in desktop OS, relative share **above 1.0**, but in a flat-to-declining market.\n- **Search (Bing):** relative share far **below 1.0** against Google — a structural follower.\n- **Gaming:** a strong #2/#3 in consoles; leadership contested.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot and assign quadrants.**\n\n| SBU | Market growth | Relative share | Quadrant |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Azure (incl. AI services) | High (>20%) | <1.0 vs. AWS | **Star** (high-growth follower reported gaining on the leader; classic Star that still consumes cash) |\n| Microsoft 365 + Copilot | Low-moderate base; Copilot high | >1.0 | **Cash Cow** with a Question-Mark rider (Copilot monetization unproven at plot time) |\n| Windows / Office desktop base | Low | >1.0 | **Cash Cow** |\n| Search / advertising (Bing) | Moderate | <<1.0 | **Question Mark / Dog** — held for strategic AI-search optionality, not standalone economics |\n| Gaming (Xbox + Activision) | Low-moderate | ~1.0 or below | **Question Mark** — large acquisition still proving its portfolio role |\n| Devices (Surface) | Low | <1.0 | **Dog** — minimal-share hardware in a mature category |\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows (2-year trajectory — often more important than current position).**\n- **Azure → strengthening.** Reported AI-driven Azure growth accelerated over 2024–2025 as AI workloads landed; the arrow points up-and-right (share gain in a still-growing market) — the trajectory that justifies aggressive investment.\n- **M365 Copilot → the pivotal arrow.** The Cash Cow's surplus is what funds the AI build; whether Copilot converts that Cash Cow into a *reinforced* Star or merely defends the base is the single most important trend to watch.\n- **Search → flat.** Despite AI-chat integration, Bing's relative position against Google did not durably change; the AI catalyst did not move the share axis.\n- **Devices → declining.** Consistent with Dog treatment.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy per SBU, and the cash-balance test.**\n\nThe defining feature of this portfolio in 2024–2026 is scale of reinvestment: Microsoft raised capital expenditure dramatically to build AI datacenter capacity, with reported annual capex reaching a scale of tens of billions of dollars and management repeatedly guiding it higher. In matrix terms:\n\n- **Cash Cows (Windows, Office base, mature M365) — harvest.** Extract surplus, minimize incremental capex on the mature base. These units are the *funding source* for the AI build.\n- **Star (Azure) — invest aggressively.** The bulk of AI capex flows here; a high-growth follower closing on the leader is exactly where the matrix says to spend.\n- **Question Marks (Copilot monetization, Gaming) — binary decide with a deadline.** Copilot needs a demonstrated attach-and-retention path to graduate to Star; Gaming must show it earns its capital claim rather than being held on sentiment.\n- **Dogs (Devices; standalone Bing economics) — hold minimally, and only where synergy is named.** Bing is retained not for standalone returns but as a distribution surface for AI search — a synergy that must be *quantified*, per this skill's Dog rule, not asserted.\n\n**Cash-balance check (the test the matrix forces):** do the Cash Cows generate enough surplus to fund Star + Question Mark investment without starving either? Microsoft's answer was to lean on the enormous, high-margin M365/Windows cash engine plus operating cash flow to self-fund most of the AI capex. This is the growth-share matrix's core discipline operating at hyperscale: **mature-market leaders are deliberately harvested so a high-growth follower can be pushed toward market leadership.**\n\n**The built-in critique.** Two of this skill's rationalizations apply directly. First, *\"applying the experience-curve assumption to software or platforms\"* — high Azure share will not mechanically produce low cost when the binding constraint is GPU supply, energy, and datacenter build, not manufacturing learning. Second, the AI-products Portfolio Pack warns of the **\"benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path\"** Star misread: an AI unit can look like a Star on capability while lacking a durable monetization path — which is precisely why Copilot is plotted as a Question-Mark rider on a Cash Cow rather than assumed to be a Star. The honest read waits for the monetization trend arrow, not the demo.\n\nThe mapped steps:\n1. Define SBUs: three reported segments + an Azure AI/Copilot unit-within-a-unit, each with named rivals\n2. Growth screen: threshold raised to ~20% for cloud/AI; mature PC-software and console growth fall below the line\n3. Relative share: Azure a fast-closing follower (<1.0), M365/Windows leaders (>1.0), Bing a structural follower\n4. Plot and assign: Azure a Star, M365/Windows Cash Cows, Copilot/Gaming Question Marks, Devices/standalone-Bing Dogs\n5. Trend arrows: Azure up-and-right; Copilot monetization the pivotal unknown; Search flat despite AI\n6. Rebalance cash: Cash Cow surplus + operating cash flow fund record AI capex directed to the Azure Star\n\n*Sources: Microsoft Corporation FY2024–FY2025 Forms 10-K and quarterly earnings releases / segment reporting (Productivity & Business Processes, Intelligent Cloud, More Personal Computing), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor ; Microsoft management commentary on Azure growth and AI capital-expenditure guidance in FY2024–FY2025 earnings calls (widely reported). Cloud-infrastructure market-share and growth context per commonly-cited industry trackers (e.g., Synergy Research, Canalys) as reported through 2025. Exact figures are qualified or omitted where not independently verifiable as of early 2026.*\n\nFile v1.0.6:examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md\n\n# Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nP&G's executive team, led by CEO A.G. Lafley, executed the most visible BCG-style portfolio restructuring of the 2000s — publicly framing it in terms nearly identical to the matrix's logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** P&G defined SBUs at brand level across approximately 170 brands spanning home care, personal care, food, and pet products.\n\n**Step 2 — Growth rates:** P&G's internal analysis identified that roughly 65 brands competed in categories with sustained global demand (laundry, baby care, shaving, feminine care); the remainder competed in slower, more fragmented, or declining categories (snack foods, pet care, batteries).\n\n**Step 3 — Relative share:** Within the core 65 brands, P&G held the #1 or #2 position in nearly every category. In the divested brands, relative share was often below 1.0 — the follower position Henderson's framework identifies as the cash-draining condition.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Portfolio action:** Between 2012 and 2016, P&G divested or discontinued approximately 100 brands — including the sale of Pringles to Kellogg's ($2.7B, 2012), the sale of the pet food business, and the divestiture of the Duracell battery brand. Lafley's public rationale: *\"We need to focus on the 70 to 80 brands where we have strong positions in categories that matter to consumers.\"* This is Cash Cow logic applied at scale — extract resources from follower positions in mature markets, reinvest in leader positions in core categories.\n\n**Validation:** Post-restructuring organic sales growth improved from approximately 1% to 4%+. Operating margin increased by roughly 3 percentage points. Market capitalization grew from approximately $200B (2014) to approximately $350B (2021).\n\nPrimary source: A.G. Lafley's investor presentations (2012–2016) and P&G annual reports. The Pringles divestiture price and market share data are from public filings.\n\nFile v1.0.6:skill-card.md\n\n## Description:\n\nMaps business units on a market-growth-versus-relative-share matrix to classify Stars, Cash Cows, Question Marks, and Dogs and guide invest, harvest, or exit recommendations.\n\nThis skill is ready for commercial/non-commercial use.\n\n## Publisher:\n\n[deciqai](https://clawhub.ai/user/deciqai)\n\n### License/Terms of Use:\n\nMIT-0\n\n## Use Case:\n\nStrategy, finance, M&A, PE/VC, and portfolio leaders use this skill to assess organizations with multiple business units competing for shared capital. It produces a portfolio map with quadrant assignments, trend arrows, cash-generator and cash-absorber reads, and resource-allocation recommendations.\n\n### Deployment Geography for Use:\n\nGlobal\n\n## Known Risks and Mitigations:\n\nRisk: The skill can produce strategic business recommendations such as investing in, harvesting, or exiting business units.\n\nMitigation: Treat outputs as decision support and require human review against current market data, financials, and governance constraints before acting.\n\nRisk: Incorrect market boundaries, growth rates, or competitor share data can lead to misleading quadrant assignments.\n\nMitigation: Validate SBU definitions, use external market-growth data, calculate relative share against the largest competitor, and refresh the analysis before budget or portfolio decisions.\n\n## Reference(s):\n\n- [ClawHub skill page](https://clawhub.ai/deciqai/skills/bcg-matrix)\n- [Sources - bcg-matrix](references/sources.md)\n- [Henderson (1970), The Product Portfolio](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio)\n- [Henderson (1973), The Experience Curve Reviewed](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history)\n- [Seeger (1984), Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix](https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108)\n- [Hambrick, MacMillan, and Day (1982), Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix](https://doi.org/10.2307/256079)\n- [Procter & Gamble annual reports](https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/)\n- [Microsoft investor relations](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor)\n\n## Skill Output:\n\n**Output Type(s):** [Text, Markdown, Analysis, Guidance]\n\n**Output Format:** [Markdown portfolio map with table-style fields and recommendation text]\n\n**Output Parameters:** [1D]\n\n**Other Properties Related to Output:** [May include quadrant assignments, trend arrows, cash-generator and cash-absorber summaries, and invest, harvest, or exit recommendations.]\n\n## Skill Version(s):\n\n1.0.6 (source: server release evidence)\n\n## Ethical Considerations:\n\nUsers should evaluate whether this skill is appropriate for their environment, review any generated or modified files before relying on them, and apply their organization's safety, security, and compliance requirements before deployment.\n\nArchive v1.0.5: 7 files, 15097 bytes\n\nFiles: examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md (4448b), examples/microsoft-ai-capital-reallocation-portfolio-2024-2026.md (8177b), examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md (2024b), references/sources.md (2420b), skill-card.md (2962b), SKILL.md (8665b), _meta.json (129b)\n\nFile v1.0.5:SKILL.md\n\n---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: `porters-five-forces` to define industry boundary first · `swot-analysis` for internal-capability depth · `ansoff-matrix` to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n- **AI capital reallocation:** deciding which units to harvest to fund AI capex / AI-native bets, and whether an AI unit is a true Star or an expensive Question Mark amid AI-native competition\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self-sufficiency].\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n\n## The Process\n\nProduce a **Portfolio Map** — quadrant assignments, trend arrows, and resource-allocation recommendations per SBU.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Must: serve an identifiable customer group, have identifiable competitors, be manageable with resource independence. Stop rule: if you cannot name the primary competitor, the boundary is wrong.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate.** 2–3 years external data; calculate CAGR. Dividing line: **10%** (raise to 20–30% for AI/clean-tech). Never use own revenue growth as a proxy.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share.** Own share ÷ largest competitor's share. >1.0 = leader; <1.0 = follower.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot.** X-axis: relative share (log, right = high); Y-axis: growth (linear, up = high); bubble size = revenue. Assign quadrant.\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows.** 2-year trajectory per SBU. Trend often matters more than current position.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy.** Star: invest aggressively. Cash Cow: extract surplus; minimize capex. Question Mark: binary — upgrade to Star OR exit by a named date. Dog: harvest/exit; hold only if synergy is named and quantified.\n\n### Output Template\n\n```\nBCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: \n```\n\n*→ Method in Action: [Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md) · [GE's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Pruning (1981–1995)](examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md)*\n*→ 2026 lens: [Microsoft's Portfolio as AI Reallocates Capital (2024–2026)](examples/microsoft-ai-capital-reallocation-portfolio-2024-2026.md) — which units are Stars, which Cash Cows fund the AI capex build, which are Question Marks or Dogs*\n\n## Portfolio Packs\n\n| Industry | Share proxy | Growth proxy | Dog trap | Star misread |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Consumer packaged goods | Nielsen/IRI retail share | Category CAGR | Legacy brand in declining format | Tiny-base subcategory inflating growth rate |\n| Enterprise SaaS | ARR share vs. ICP rivals | Gartner/IDC forecast | Feature-complete product commoditizing | VC competitor's discount-driven \"growth\" |\n| AI products (2024+) | Monthly active API users vs. nearest rival | Segment TAM growth | Model-wrapper with no defensible moat | Benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path |\n| Retail/e-commerce | GMV share | Segment GMV CAGR | Category with free platform substitute | High-growth vertical with dominant incumbent |\n\n*→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)*\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n**[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.**\n\n| Fake move | Reality |\n|---|---|\n| [D] Using absolute share instead of relative share | A 25%-share firm facing a 40% rival is a follower. Absolute share hides competitive position. |\n| [D] Defining market too broadly to manufacture high relative share | Calling a niche player in \"enterprise software\" a leader obscures the actual threat. |\n| [D] Labeling every Dog as \"strategic\" to avoid exit | Synergy must be quantifiable — name the mechanism and the dollar amount. |\n| [D] Treating the matrix as a one-time exercise | Growth rates and positions shift. Refresh annually at minimum. |\n| [D] Assuming every Question Mark deserves investment | Correct default is a defined decision deadline. Most Question Marks should be exited. |\n| [D] Using BCG to justify a decision already made | If unit definitions are chosen after quadrant destinations are known, the analysis is reverse-engineered. |\n| [D] Applying experience-curve assumption to software or platforms | High share does not mechanically produce low costs in knowledge-intensive businesses. |\n| [D] Treating all Cash Cows as permanent | Cows can become Dogs. Maintain a deterioration watch with leading indicators. |\n| *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Market boundary defined after desired quadrant assignment is known · relative share uses own revenue not competitor's share · all Question Marks described as \"likely Stars\" with no exit criteria · no trend arrows · Dogs retained with unquantified synergy · Cash Cows don't cover Stars + Question Mark investment needs · matrix used as a slide with no reallocation following\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Each SBU passes the standalone-manager test (identifiable market, rivals, separable P&L)\n- [ ] Relative share = own share ÷ largest competitor's share (not absolute share)\n- [ ] Market growth from external data, not own revenue growth\n- [ ] 2-year trend arrows plotted for each SBU\n- [ ] Cash Cow generation quantified against Star + Question Mark investment needs\n- [ ] Each Dog has an exit plan or a named, quantified synergy\n- [ ] Each Question Mark has a decision deadline with invest-or-exit criteria\n- [ ] Refresh cadence scheduled (state the date)\n\n---\n\n*Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — 189 open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. The same skills power every deciqAI agent, which runs them autonomously to operate your company. **See it run → https://www.deciqai.com/c/bcg-matrix** · ⭐ Star the repo → https://github.com/deciqAI/knowledge-skills · Contributions welcome.*\n\nFile v1.0.5:_meta.json\n\n{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.5\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1783595742623\n}\n\nFile v1.0.5:references/sources.md\n\n# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n- Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. Primary source for the GE worked example — the #1-or-#2 \"fix, sell, or close\" rule, the three-circles framework, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition.\n- Microsoft Corporation. Forms 10-K (FY2024, FY2025) and quarterly earnings releases. Primary source for the 2024–2026 AI-capital-reallocation example — three-segment structure (Productivity & Business Processes, Intelligent Cloud, More Personal Computing), Azure growth, and AI capital-expenditure guidance. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor\n- Cloud-infrastructure market-share and growth trackers (e.g., Synergy Research Group, Canalys) as reported through 2025. Context for the relative-share axis (AWS leader, Azure #2, Google Cloud follower) in the Microsoft example. Used as directional market-share context, not as precise-figure evidence.\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here.\n\nFile v1.0.5:examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md\n\n# Method in Action: General Electric's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Portfolio Pruning (1981–1995)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nWhen Jack Welch became CEO in April 1981, General Electric was the archetypal diversified conglomerate: dozens of strategic business units — a structure GE itself had pioneered in its 1970 reorganization — spanning lighting, appliances, motors, power systems, aerospace, mining, housewares, and consumer electronics. The company was profitable in aggregate, but shared capital was spread across hundreds of product lines regardless of competitive position. Welch's response was an operational enactment of growth-share portfolio logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** GE's existing SBU structure already passed the standalone-manager test — each unit had an identifiable market, named competitors, and a separable P&L. This made the portfolio immediately mappable.\n\n**Steps 2–3 — The two axes, collapsed into a rule:** Welch compressed the matrix's two dimensions into a single test. The relative-share axis became the famous rule that every business must be **#1 or #2 in its market** — leadership in Henderson's relative-share sense — or be fixed, sold, or closed. The growth axis became his \"three circles\" sketch of 1983: only businesses inside the circles of **core manufacturing, technology, and services** — the sectors GE judged to have structural growth or defensible economics — earned a claim on capital. A business outside the circles with a follower share was, in matrix terms, a Dog.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Quadrant actions and cash rebalancing:**\n\n- **Dogs and weak Question Marks — exit.** GE sold the housewares business to Black & Decker (1984), divested Utah International's mining operations (1984), exited air conditioning, and in 1987 traded its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France in exchange for Thomson's medical-imaging business — swapping a follower position in a brutal market for added share in a business where GE led. Headcount fell by well over 100,000 during the 1980s through divestiture and restructuring, earning Welch the \"Neutron Jack\" nickname.\n- **Cash Cows — harvest.** Mature leaders such as lighting, motors, and major appliances were run for cash with disciplined capital expenditure rather than growth investment.\n- **Stars and promoted Question Marks — invest.** Divestiture proceeds and Cash Cow surplus funded aggressive investment in GE Capital, medical systems, and plastics, and financed the $6.3 billion acquisition of RCA (1986), which brought NBC into the portfolio.\n\n**Validation:** GE's market capitalization grew from roughly $13 billion in 1981 to over $400 billion by Welch's retirement in 2001 — for a period, the most valuable company in the world.\n\n**The built-in critique (1995):** The case also documents the matrix's classic failure mode. Welch recounts in his memoir that by the mid-1990s, managers had learned to game the #1-or-#2 rule by defining their markets narrowly enough to claim leadership — exactly the rationalization this skill flags as \"defining the market to manufacture high relative share.\" Prompted by a critique surfaced in a Crotonville management class, Welch inverted the discipline: businesses were ordered to redefine their markets so broadly that their share fell **below 10%**, forcing them to see growth headroom the old rule had hidden. The map is only as honest as the market boundary.\n\nThe mapped steps:\n1. Define SBUs: GE's pre-existing SBU structure — identifiable markets, competitors, separable P&Ls\n2. Growth screen: the \"three circles\" (core, technology, services) as the high-growth / structurally attractive test\n3. Relative share: the #1-or-#2 rule as an operational proxy for relative market share > 1.0\n4. Plot and assign: businesses outside the circles with follower share treated as Dogs\n5. Rebalance cash: divestiture proceeds plus Cash Cow surplus redirected to GE Capital, medical systems, and RCA/NBC\n6. Refresh and self-correct: the 1995 market-redefinition order fixed the narrow-boundary gaming the rule had created\n\nPrimary source: Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. The #1-or-#2 rule, the three-circles framework, the major divestitures and the RCA acquisition, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition are all recounted there and in GE annual reports of the period.\n\nFile v1.0.5:examples/microsoft-ai-capital-reallocation-portfolio-2024-2026.md\n\n# Method in Action: Microsoft's Product Portfolio as AI Reallocates Capital (2024–2026)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nBy 2024–2026, Microsoft had become the clearest large-cap case of a diversified technology portfolio being re-mapped by the AI capital cycle. The strategic question was not \"are we in AI\" but a portfolio question the growth-share matrix is built for: **which mature units throw off enough cash to fund a historically large AI capex build-out, which AI bets are genuine Stars versus expensive Question Marks, and which legacy units are quietly slipping toward Dog status.** This example applies the skill's process to Microsoft's reported segment structure as of early 2026. Figures are drawn from Microsoft's public segment reporting and widely-reported disclosures; where an exact number is uncertain it is qualified or omitted.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Microsoft reports three segments, each passing the standalone-manager test (identifiable customers, named rivals, separable P&L):\n- **Productivity & Business Processes** — Microsoft 365 / Office, Copilot for M365, LinkedIn, Dynamics. Rivals: Google Workspace, Salesforce.\n- **Intelligent Cloud** — Azure and server products. Rival: AWS (leader), Google Cloud (follower).\n- **More Personal Computing** — Windows, devices (Surface), search/advertising (Bing), and gaming (Xbox / Activision Blizzard). Rivals vary by line: Apple, Sony/Nintendo, Google.\n\nFor AI-specific reads we also treat **Azure AI / Copilot** as an emerging unit-within-a-unit, because it is where the capital and the competitive fight are concentrated.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate (threshold raised to ~20% for cloud/AI).** Following the skill's rule to raise the dividing line for AI-adjacent markets: public cloud infrastructure was reported growing at roughly 20%-or-more annually through this period, and the generative-AI segment faster off a smaller base. Mature PC software (Windows, Office seat growth) and console gaming grew in the low single digits — clearly *below* the line. Never use Microsoft's own revenue growth as the proxy; the axis is external market CAGR.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share (own share ÷ largest rival's share).**\n- **Azure:** the reported #2 in cloud infrastructure behind AWS, so relative share is **below 1.0** — a follower that had been reported gaining share.\n- **Microsoft 365 / Office:** dominant in paid enterprise productivity, relative share **well above 1.0** — a leader.\n- **Windows:** dominant in desktop OS, relative share **above 1.0**, but in a flat-to-declining market.\n- **Search (Bing):** relative share far **below 1.0** against Google — a structural follower.\n- **Gaming:** a strong #2/#3 in consoles; leadership contested.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot and assign quadrants.**\n\n| SBU | Market growth | Relative share | Quadrant |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Azure (incl. AI services) | High (>20%) | <1.0 vs. AWS | **Star** (high-growth follower reported gaining on the leader; classic Star that still consumes cash) |\n| Microsoft 365 + Copilot | Low-moderate base; Copilot high | >1.0 | **Cash Cow** with a Question-Mark rider (Copilot monetization unproven at plot time) |\n| Windows / Office desktop base | Low | >1.0 | **Cash Cow** |\n| Search / advertising (Bing) | Moderate | <<1.0 | **Question Mark / Dog** — held for strategic AI-search optionality, not standalone economics |\n| Gaming (Xbox + Activision) | Low-moderate | ~1.0 or below | **Question Mark** — large acquisition still proving its portfolio role |\n| Devices (Surface) | Low | <1.0 | **Dog** — minimal-share hardware in a mature category |\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows (2-year trajectory — often more important than current position).**\n- **Azure → strengthening.** Reported AI-driven Azure growth accelerated over 2024–2025 as AI workloads landed; the arrow points up-and-right (share gain in a still-growing market) — the trajectory that justifies aggressive investment.\n- **M365 Copilot → the pivotal arrow.** The Cash Cow's surplus is what funds the AI build; whether Copilot converts that Cash Cow into a *reinforced* Star or merely defends the base is the single most important trend to watch.\n- **Search → flat.** Despite AI-chat integration, Bing's relative position against Google did not durably change; the AI catalyst did not move the share axis.\n- **Devices → declining.** Consistent with Dog treatment.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy per SBU, and the cash-balance test.**\n\nThe defining feature of this portfolio in 2024–2026 is scale of reinvestment: Microsoft raised capital expenditure dramatically to build AI datacenter capacity, with reported annual capex reaching a scale of tens of billions of dollars and management repeatedly guiding it higher. In matrix terms:\n\n- **Cash Cows (Windows, Office base, mature M365) — harvest.** Extract surplus, minimize incremental capex on the mature base. These units are the *funding source* for the AI build.\n- **Star (Azure) — invest aggressively.** The bulk of AI capex flows here; a high-growth follower closing on the leader is exactly where the matrix says to spend.\n- **Question Marks (Copilot monetization, Gaming) — binary decide with a deadline.** Copilot needs a demonstrated attach-and-retention path to graduate to Star; Gaming must show it earns its capital claim rather than being held on sentiment.\n- **Dogs (Devices; standalone Bing economics) — hold minimally, and only where synergy is named.** Bing is retained not for standalone returns but as a distribution surface for AI search — a synergy that must be *quantified*, per this skill's Dog rule, not asserted.\n\n**Cash-balance check (the test the matrix forces):** do the Cash Cows generate enough surplus to fund Star + Question Mark investment without starving either? Microsoft's answer was to lean on the enormous, high-margin M365/Windows cash engine plus operating cash flow to self-fund most of the AI capex. This is the growth-share matrix's core discipline operating at hyperscale: **mature-market leaders are deliberately harvested so a high-growth follower can be pushed toward market leadership.**\n\n**The built-in critique.** Two of this skill's rationalizations apply directly. First, *\"applying the experience-curve assumption to software or platforms\"* — high Azure share will not mechanically produce low cost when the binding constraint is GPU supply, energy, and datacenter build, not manufacturing learning. Second, the AI-products Portfolio Pack warns of the **\"benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path\"** Star misread: an AI unit can look like a Star on capability while lacking a durable monetization path — which is precisely why Copilot is plotted as a Question-Mark rider on a Cash Cow rather than assumed to be a Star. The honest read waits for the monetization trend arrow, not the demo.\n\nThe mapped steps:\n1. Define SBUs: three reported segments + an Azure AI/Copilot unit-within-a-unit, each with named rivals\n2. Growth screen: threshold raised to ~20% for cloud/AI; mature PC-software and console growth fall below the line\n3. Relative share: Azure a fast-closing follower (<1.0), M365/Windows leaders (>1.0), Bing a structural follower\n4. Plot and assign: Azure a Star, M365/Windows Cash Cows, Copilot/Gaming Question Marks, Devices/standalone-Bing Dogs\n5. Trend arrows: Azure up-and-right; Copilot monetization the pivotal unknown; Search flat despite AI\n6. Rebalance cash: Cash Cow surplus + operating cash flow fund record AI capex directed to the Azure Star\n\n*Sources: Microsoft Corporation FY2024–FY2025 Forms 10-K and quarterly earnings releases / segment reporting (Productivity & Business Processes, Intelligent Cloud, More Personal Computing), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor ; Microsoft management commentary on Azure growth and AI capital-expenditure guidance in FY2024–FY2025 earnings calls (widely reported). Cloud-infrastructure market-share and growth context per commonly-cited industry trackers (e.g., Synergy Research, Canalys) as reported through 2025. Exact figures are qualified or omitted where not independently verifiable as of early 2026.*\n\nFile v1.0.5:examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md\n\n# Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nP&G's executive team, led by CEO A.G. Lafley, executed the most visible BCG-style portfolio restructuring of the 2000s — publicly framing it in terms nearly identical to the matrix's logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** P&G defined SBUs at brand level across approximately 170 brands spanning home care, personal care, food, and pet products.\n\n**Step 2 — Growth rates:** P&G's internal analysis identified that roughly 65 brands competed in categories with sustained global demand (laundry, baby care, shaving, feminine care); the remainder competed in slower, more fragmented, or declining categories (snack foods, pet care, batteries).\n\n**Step 3 — Relative share:** Within the core 65 brands, P&G held the #1 or #2 position in nearly every category. In the divested brands, relative share was often below 1.0 — the follower position Henderson's framework identifies as the cash-draining condition.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Portfolio action:** Between 2012 and 2016, P&G divested or discontinued approximately 100 brands — including the sale of Pringles to Kellogg's ($2.7B, 2012), the sale of the pet food business, and the divestiture of the Duracell battery brand. Lafley's public rationale: *\"We need to focus on the 70 to 80 brands where we have strong positions in categories that matter to consumers.\"* This is Cash Cow logic applied at scale — extract resources from follower positions in mature markets, reinvest in leader positions in core categories.\n\n**Validation:** Post-restructuring organic sales growth improved from approximately 1% to 4%+. Operating margin increased by roughly 3 percentage points. Market capitalization grew from approximately $200B (2014) to approximately $350B (2021).\n\nPrimary source: A.G. Lafley's investor presentations (2012–2016) and P&G annual reports. The Pringles divestiture price and market share data are from public filings.\n\nFile v1.0.5:skill-card.md\n\n## Description:
\nMaps multi-business portfolios on market growth and relative market share to identify cash generators, cash absorbers, and invest, harvest, or exit recommendations.
\n\nThis skill is ready for commercial/non-commercial use.
\n\n## Publisher:
\n[deciqai](https://clawhub.ai/user/deciqai)
\n\n### License/Terms of Use:
\nMIT-0
\n\n\n## Use Case:
\nStrategy teams, boards, investors, and operators use this skill to review portfolios with multiple business units, compare market growth against relative market share, and make resource-allocation decisions. It is suited to annual strategy reviews, budget prioritization, PE/VC portfolio health reads, M&A retain-or-divest decisions, and AI capital reallocation discussions.
\n\n### Deployment Geography for Use:
\nGlobal
\n\n## Known Risks and Mitigations:
\nRisk: Portfolio recommendations can be wrong or outdated if market growth, relative share, financial, or company-example claims are stale or inaccurate.
\nMitigation: Verify the input data and cited business facts against current trusted sources before making budget, investment, divestiture, or operating decisions.
\nRisk: The matrix can mislead when business-unit boundaries, market definitions, competitor shares, or strategic synergies are chosen to justify a preferred outcome.
\nMitigation: Confirm each unit has identifiable customers, competitors, and separable economics; require external market growth data, relative-share calculations, trend arrows, decision deadlines, and quantified synergies.
\n\n\n## Reference(s):
\n- [Sources - bcg-matrix](references/sources.md)
\n- [The Product Portfolio](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio)
\n- [The Experience Curve Reviewed](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history)
\n- [Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix](https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108)
\n- [Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix](https://doi.org/10.2307/256079)
\n- [Procter & Gamble Annual Reports](https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/)
\n- [Microsoft Investor Relations](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor)
\n\n\n## Skill Output:
\n**Output Type(s):** [Guidance, Analysis, Markdown]
\n**Output Format:** [Markdown with portfolio tables, trend notes, and resource-allocation recommendations]
\n**Output Parameters:** [1D]
\n**Other Properties Related to Output:** [May ask step-by-step coaching questions and stop for user input when the user lacks portfolio data.]
\n\n## Skill Version(s):
\n1.0.5 (source: server release evidence)
\n\n## Ethical Considerations:
\nUsers should evaluate whether this skill is appropriate for their environment, review any generated or modified files before relying on them, and apply their organization's safety, security, and compliance requirements before deployment.
\n\nArchive v1.0.4: 6 files, 10632 bytes\n\nFiles: examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md (4448b), examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md (2024b), references/sources.md (1762b), skill-card.md (2934b), SKILL.md (8223b), _meta.json (129b)\n\nFile v1.0.4:SKILL.md\n\n---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: `porters-five-forces` to define industry boundary first · `swot-analysis` for internal-capability depth · `ansoff-matrix` to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self-sufficiency].\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n\n## The Process\n\nProduce a **Portfolio Map** — quadrant assignments, trend arrows, and resource-allocation recommendations per SBU.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Must: serve an identifiable customer group, have identifiable competitors, be manageable with resource independence. Stop rule: if you cannot name the primary competitor, the boundary is wrong.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate.** 2–3 years external data; calculate CAGR. Dividing line: **10%** (raise to 20–30% for AI/clean-tech). Never use own revenue growth as a proxy.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share.** Own share ÷ largest competitor's share. >1.0 = leader; <1.0 = follower.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot.** X-axis: relative share (log, right = high); Y-axis: growth (linear, up = high); bubble size = revenue. Assign quadrant.\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows.** 2-year trajectory per SBU. Trend often matters more than current position.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy.** Star: invest aggressively. Cash Cow: extract surplus; minimize capex. Question Mark: binary — upgrade to Star OR exit by a named date. Dog: harvest/exit; hold only if synergy is named and quantified.\n\n### Output Template\n\n```\nBCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: \n```\n\n*→ Method in Action: [Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md) · [GE's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Pruning (1981–1995)](examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md)*\n\n## Portfolio Packs\n\n| Industry | Share proxy | Growth proxy | Dog trap | Star misread |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Consumer packaged goods | Nielsen/IRI retail share | Category CAGR | Legacy brand in declining format | Tiny-base subcategory inflating growth rate |\n| Enterprise SaaS | ARR share vs. ICP rivals | Gartner/IDC forecast | Feature-complete product commoditizing | VC competitor's discount-driven \"growth\" |\n| AI products (2024+) | Monthly active API users vs. nearest rival | Segment TAM growth | Model-wrapper with no defensible moat | Benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path |\n| Retail/e-commerce | GMV share | Segment GMV CAGR | Category with free platform substitute | High-growth vertical with dominant incumbent |\n\n*→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)*\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n**[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.**\n\n| Fake move | Reality |\n|---|---|\n| [D] Using absolute share instead of relative share | A 25%-share firm facing a 40% rival is a follower. Absolute share hides competitive position. |\n| [D] Defining market too broadly to manufacture high relative share | Calling a niche player in \"enterprise software\" a leader obscures the actual threat. |\n| [D] Labeling every Dog as \"strategic\" to avoid exit | Synergy must be quantifiable — name the mechanism and the dollar amount. |\n| [D] Treating the matrix as a one-time exercise | Growth rates and positions shift. Refresh annually at minimum. |\n| [D] Assuming every Question Mark deserves investment | Correct default is a defined decision deadline. Most Question Marks should be exited. |\n| [D] Using BCG to justify a decision already made | If unit definitions are chosen after quadrant destinations are known, the analysis is reverse-engineered. |\n| [D] Applying experience-curve assumption to software or platforms | High share does not mechanically produce low costs in knowledge-intensive businesses. |\n| [D] Treating all Cash Cows as permanent | Cows can become Dogs. Maintain a deterioration watch with leading indicators. |\n| *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Market boundary defined after desired quadrant assignment is known · relative share uses own revenue not competitor's share · all Question Marks described as \"likely Stars\" with no exit criteria · no trend arrows · Dogs retained with unquantified synergy · Cash Cows don't cover Stars + Question Mark investment needs · matrix used as a slide with no reallocation following\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Each SBU passes the standalone-manager test (identifiable market, rivals, separable P&L)\n- [ ] Relative share = own share ÷ largest competitor's share (not absolute share)\n- [ ] Market growth from external data, not own revenue growth\n- [ ] 2-year trend arrows plotted for each SBU\n- [ ] Cash Cow generation quantified against Star + Question Mark investment needs\n- [ ] Each Dog has an exit plan or a named, quantified synergy\n- [ ] Each Question Mark has a decision deadline with invest-or-exit criteria\n- [ ] Refresh cadence scheduled (state the date)\n\n---\n\n*Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — 164 open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. The same skills power every deciqAI agent, which runs them autonomously to operate your company. **See it run → https://www.deciqai.com/c/bcg-matrix** · ⭐ Star the repo → https://github.com/deciqAI/knowledge-skills · Contributions welcome.*\n\nFile v1.0.4:_meta.json\n\n{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.4\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1783508081341\n}\n\nFile v1.0.4:references/sources.md\n\n# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n- Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. Primary source for the GE worked example — the #1-or-#2 \"fix, sell, or close\" rule, the three-circles framework, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition.\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here.\n\nFile v1.0.4:examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md\n\n# Method in Action: General Electric's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Portfolio Pruning (1981–1995)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nWhen Jack Welch became CEO in April 1981, General Electric was the archetypal diversified conglomerate: dozens of strategic business units — a structure GE itself had pioneered in its 1970 reorganization — spanning lighting, appliances, motors, power systems, aerospace, mining, housewares, and consumer electronics. The company was profitable in aggregate, but shared capital was spread across hundreds of product lines regardless of competitive position. Welch's response was an operational enactment of growth-share portfolio logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** GE's existing SBU structure already passed the standalone-manager test — each unit had an identifiable market, named competitors, and a separable P&L. This made the portfolio immediately mappable.\n\n**Steps 2–3 — The two axes, collapsed into a rule:** Welch compressed the matrix's two dimensions into a single test. The relative-share axis became the famous rule that every business must be **#1 or #2 in its market** — leadership in Henderson's relative-share sense — or be fixed, sold, or closed. The growth axis became his \"three circles\" sketch of 1983: only businesses inside the circles of **core manufacturing, technology, and services** — the sectors GE judged to have structural growth or defensible economics — earned a claim on capital. A business outside the circles with a follower share was, in matrix terms, a Dog.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Quadrant actions and cash rebalancing:**\n\n- **Dogs and weak Question Marks — exit.** GE sold the housewares business to Black & Decker (1984), divested Utah International's mining operations (1984), exited air conditioning, and in 1987 traded its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France in exchange for Thomson's medical-imaging business — swapping a follower position in a brutal market for added share in a business where GE led. Headcount fell by well over 100,000 during the 1980s through divestiture and restructuring, earning Welch the \"Neutron Jack\" nickname.\n- **Cash Cows — harvest.** Mature leaders such as lighting, motors, and major appliances were run for cash with disciplined capital expenditure rather than growth investment.\n- **Stars and promoted Question Marks — invest.** Divestiture proceeds and Cash Cow surplus funded aggressive investment in GE Capital, medical systems, and plastics, and financed the $6.3 billion acquisition of RCA (1986), which brought NBC into the portfolio.\n\n**Validation:** GE's market capitalization grew from roughly $13 billion in 1981 to over $400 billion by Welch's retirement in 2001 — for a period, the most valuable company in the world.\n\n**The built-in critique (1995):** The case also documents the matrix's classic failure mode. Welch recounts in his memoir that by the mid-1990s, managers had learned to game the #1-or-#2 rule by defining their markets narrowly enough to claim leadership — exactly the rationalization this skill flags as \"defining the market to manufacture high relative share.\" Prompted by a critique surfaced in a Crotonville management class, Welch inverted the discipline: businesses were ordered to redefine their markets so broadly that their share fell **below 10%**, forcing them to see growth headroom the old rule had hidden. The map is only as honest as the market boundary.\n\nThe mapped steps:\n1. Define SBUs: GE's pre-existing SBU structure — identifiable markets, competitors, separable P&Ls\n2. Growth screen: the \"three circles\" (core, technology, services) as the high-growth / structurally attractive test\n3. Relative share: the #1-or-#2 rule as an operational proxy for relative market share > 1.0\n4. Plot and assign: businesses outside the circles with follower share treated as Dogs\n5. Rebalance cash: divestiture proceeds plus Cash Cow surplus redirected to GE Capital, medical systems, and RCA/NBC\n6. Refresh and self-correct: the 1995 market-redefinition order fixed the narrow-boundary gaming the rule had created\n\nPrimary source: Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. The #1-or-#2 rule, the three-circles framework, the major divestitures and the RCA acquisition, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition are all recounted there and in GE annual reports of the period.\n\nFile v1.0.4:examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md\n\n# Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nP&G's executive team, led by CEO A.G. Lafley, executed the most visible BCG-style portfolio restructuring of the 2000s — publicly framing it in terms nearly identical to the matrix's logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** P&G defined SBUs at brand level across approximately 170 brands spanning home care, personal care, food, and pet products.\n\n**Step 2 — Growth rates:** P&G's internal analysis identified that roughly 65 brands competed in categories with sustained global demand (laundry, baby care, shaving, feminine care); the remainder competed in slower, more fragmented, or declining categories (snack foods, pet care, batteries).\n\n**Step 3 — Relative share:** Within the core 65 brands, P&G held the #1 or #2 position in nearly every category. In the divested brands, relative share was often below 1.0 — the follower position Henderson's framework identifies as the cash-draining condition.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Portfolio action:** Between 2012 and 2016, P&G divested or discontinued approximately 100 brands — including the sale of Pringles to Kellogg's ($2.7B, 2012), the sale of the pet food business, and the divestiture of the Duracell battery brand. Lafley's public rationale: *\"We need to focus on the 70 to 80 brands where we have strong positions in categories that matter to consumers.\"* This is Cash Cow logic applied at scale — extract resources from follower positions in mature markets, reinvest in leader positions in core categories.\n\n**Validation:** Post-restructuring organic sales growth improved from approximately 1% to 4%+. Operating margin increased by roughly 3 percentage points. Market capitalization grew from approximately $200B (2014) to approximately $350B (2021).\n\nPrimary source: A.G. Lafley's investor presentations (2012–2016) and P&G annual reports. The Pringles divestiture price and market share data are from public filings.\n\nFile v1.0.4:skill-card.md\n\n## Description:
\nMaps business units on a BCG growth-share matrix to classify Stars, Cash Cows, Question Marks, and Dogs and produce resource-allocation recommendations.
\n\nThis skill is ready for commercial/non-commercial use.
\n\n## Publisher:
\n[deciqai](https://clawhub.ai/user/deciqai)
\n\n### License/Terms of Use:
\nMIT-0
\n\n\n## Use Case:
\nStrategy teams, investors, boards, and portfolio operators use this skill to compare multiple business units competing for shared capital and decide where to invest, harvest, hold, or exit. It is best suited to portfolio reviews with distinct units, identifiable competitors, and market growth data.
\n\n### Deployment Geography for Use:
\nGlobal
\n\n## Known Risks and Mitigations:
\nRisk: Recommendations can influence high-impact business choices such as investment, divestiture, or exits.
\nMitigation: Treat outputs as advisory strategy guidance, verify market data, and apply human review before acting.
\nRisk: Incorrect market boundaries, own-revenue growth proxies, or unverified competitor share data can distort quadrant assignments.
\nMitigation: Use external market growth data, define standalone strategic business units, identify primary competitors, and verify relative share calculations.
\n\n\n## Reference(s):
\n- [ClawHub skill page](https://clawhub.ai/deciqai/skills/bcg-matrix)
\n- [Sources - bcg-matrix](references/sources.md)
\n- [Procter & Gamble Brand Portfolio Restructuring example](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md)
\n- [GE Fix, Sell, or Close Portfolio Pruning example](examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md)
\n- [BCG: The Product Portfolio](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio)
\n- [BCG: The Experience Curve Reviewed](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history)
\n- [Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix](https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108)
\n- [Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix](https://doi.org/10.2307/256079)
\n- [Procter & Gamble Annual Reports](https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/)
\n\n\n## Skill Output:
\n**Output Type(s):** [text, markdown, guidance]
\n**Output Format:** [Markdown portfolio map with tables, quadrant assignments, trend notes, and recommendations]
\n**Output Parameters:** [1D]
\n**Other Properties Related to Output:** [May include staged coaching questions when the user lacks portfolio data.]
\n\n## Skill Version(s):
\n1.0.4 (source: server release evidence)
\n\n## Ethical Considerations:
\nUsers should evaluate whether this skill is appropriate for their environment, review any generated or modified files before relying on them, and apply their organization's safety, security, and compliance requirements before deployment.
\n\nArchive v1.0.3: 6 files, 10485 bytes\n\nFiles: examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md (4448b), examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md (2024b), references/sources.md (1762b), skill-card.md (2587b), SKILL.md (8323b), _meta.json (129b)\n\nFile v1.0.3:SKILL.md\n\n---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: `porters-five-forces` to define industry boundary first · `swot-analysis` for internal-capability depth · `ansoff-matrix` to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self-sufficiency].\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n\n## The Process\n\nProduce a **Portfolio Map** — quadrant assignments, trend arrows, and resource-allocation recommendations per SBU.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Must: serve an identifiable customer group, have identifiable competitors, be manageable with resource independence. Stop rule: if you cannot name the primary competitor, the boundary is wrong.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate.** 2–3 years external data; calculate CAGR. Dividing line: **10%** (raise to 20–30% for AI/clean-tech). Never use own revenue growth as a proxy.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share.** Own share ÷ largest competitor's share. >1.0 = leader; <1.0 = follower.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot.** X-axis: relative share (log, right = high); Y-axis: growth (linear, up = high); bubble size = revenue. Assign quadrant.\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows.** 2-year trajectory per SBU. Trend often matters more than current position.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy.** Star: invest aggressively. Cash Cow: extract surplus; minimize capex. Question Mark: binary — upgrade to Star OR exit by a named date. Dog: harvest/exit; hold only if synergy is named and quantified.\n\n### Output Template\n\n```\nBCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: \n```\n\n*→ Method in Action: [Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md) · [GE's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Pruning (1981–1995)](examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md)*\n\n## Portfolio Packs\n\n| Industry | Share proxy | Growth proxy | Dog trap | Star misread |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Consumer packaged goods | Nielsen/IRI retail share | Category CAGR | Legacy brand in declining format | Tiny-base subcategory inflating growth rate |\n| Enterprise SaaS | ARR share vs. ICP rivals | Gartner/IDC forecast | Feature-complete product commoditizing | VC competitor's discount-driven \"growth\" |\n| AI products (2024+) | Monthly active API users vs. nearest rival | Segment TAM growth | Model-wrapper with no defensible moat | Benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path |\n| Retail/e-commerce | GMV share | Segment GMV CAGR | Category with free platform substitute | High-growth vertical with dominant incumbent |\n\n*→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)*\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n**[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.**\n\n| Fake move | Reality |\n|---|---|\n| [D] Using absolute share instead of relative share | A 25%-share firm facing a 40% rival is a follower. Absolute share hides competitive position. |\n| [D] Defining market too broadly to manufacture high relative share | Calling a niche player in \"enterprise software\" a leader obscures the actual threat. |\n| [D] Labeling every Dog as \"strategic\" to avoid exit | Synergy must be quantifiable — name the mechanism and the dollar amount. |\n| [D] Treating the matrix as a one-time exercise | Growth rates and positions shift. Refresh annually at minimum. |\n| [D] Assuming every Question Mark deserves investment | Correct default is a defined decision deadline. Most Question Marks should be exited. |\n| [D] Using BCG to justify a decision already made | If unit definitions are chosen after quadrant destinations are known, the analysis is reverse-engineered. |\n| [D] Applying experience-curve assumption to software or platforms | High share does not mechanically produce low costs in knowledge-intensive businesses. |\n| [D] Treating all Cash Cows as permanent | Cows can become Dogs. Maintain a deterioration watch with leading indicators. |\n| *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Market boundary defined after desired quadrant assignment is known · relative share uses own revenue not competitor's share · all Question Marks described as \"likely Stars\" with no exit criteria · no trend arrows · Dogs retained with unquantified synergy · Cash Cows don't cover Stars + Question Mark investment needs · matrix used as a slide with no reallocation following\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Each SBU passes the standalone-manager test (identifiable market, rivals, separable P&L)\n- [ ] Relative share = own share ÷ largest competitor's share (not absolute share)\n- [ ] Market growth from external data, not own revenue growth\n- [ ] 2-year trend arrows plotted for each SBU\n- [ ] Cash Cow generation quantified against Star + Question Mark investment needs\n- [ ] Each Dog has an exit plan or a named, quantified synergy\n- [ ] Each Question Mark has a decision deadline with invest-or-exit criteria\n- [ ] Refresh cadence scheduled (state the date)\n\n---\n\n*Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — 163 open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. The same skills power every deciqAI agent, which runs them autonomously to operate your company. **See it run → https://www.deciqai.com/skills/bcg-matrix?utm_source=clawhub&utm_medium=marketplace&utm_campaign=knowledge-skills&utm_content=bcg-matrix** · ⭐ Star the repo → https://github.com/deciqAI/knowledge-skills · Contributions welcome.*\n\nFile v1.0.3:_meta.json\n\n{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.3\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1783482650174\n}\n\nFile v1.0.3:references/sources.md\n\n# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n- Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. Primary source for the GE worked example — the #1-or-#2 \"fix, sell, or close\" rule, the three-circles framework, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition.\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here.\n\nFile v1.0.3:examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md\n\n# Method in Action: General Electric's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Portfolio Pruning (1981–1995)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nWhen Jack Welch became CEO in April 1981, General Electric was the archetypal diversified conglomerate: dozens of strategic business units — a structure GE itself had pioneered in its 1970 reorganization — spanning lighting, appliances, motors, power systems, aerospace, mining, housewares, and consumer electronics. The company was profitable in aggregate, but shared capital was spread across hundreds of product lines regardless of competitive position. Welch's response was an operational enactment of growth-share portfolio logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** GE's existing SBU structure already passed the standalone-manager test — each unit had an identifiable market, named competitors, and a separable P&L. This made the portfolio immediately mappable.\n\n**Steps 2–3 — The two axes, collapsed into a rule:** Welch compressed the matrix's two dimensions into a single test. The relative-share axis became the famous rule that every business must be **#1 or #2 in its market** — leadership in Henderson's relative-share sense — or be fixed, sold, or closed. The growth axis became his \"three circles\" sketch of 1983: only businesses inside the circles of **core manufacturing, technology, and services** — the sectors GE judged to have structural growth or defensible economics — earned a claim on capital. A business outside the circles with a follower share was, in matrix terms, a Dog.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Quadrant actions and cash rebalancing:**\n\n- **Dogs and weak Question Marks — exit.** GE sold the housewares business to Black & Decker (1984), divested Utah International's mining operations (1984), exited air conditioning, and in 1987 traded its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France in exchange for Thomson's medical-imaging business — swapping a follower position in a brutal market for added share in a business where GE led. Headcount fell by well over 100,000 during the 1980s through divestiture and restructuring, earning Welch the \"Neutron Jack\" nickname.\n- **Cash Cows — harvest.** Mature leaders such as lighting, motors, and major appliances were run for cash with disciplined capital expenditure rather than growth investment.\n- **Stars and promoted Question Marks — invest.** Divestiture proceeds and Cash Cow surplus funded aggressive investment in GE Capital, medical systems, and plastics, and financed the $6.3 billion acquisition of RCA (1986), which brought NBC into the portfolio.\n\n**Validation:** GE's market capitalization grew from roughly $13 billion in 1981 to over $400 billion by Welch's retirement in 2001 — for a period, the most valuable company in the world.\n\n**The built-in critique (1995):** The case also documents the matrix's classic failure mode. Welch recounts in his memoir that by the mid-1990s, managers had learned to game the #1-or-#2 rule by defining their markets narrowly enough to claim leadership — exactly the rationalization this skill flags as \"defining the market to manufacture high relative share.\" Prompted by a critique surfaced in a Crotonville management class, Welch inverted the discipline: businesses were ordered to redefine their markets so broadly that their share fell **below 10%**, forcing them to see growth headroom the old rule had hidden. The map is only as honest as the market boundary.\n\nThe mapped steps:\n1. Define SBUs: GE's pre-existing SBU structure — identifiable markets, competitors, separable P&Ls\n2. Growth screen: the \"three circles\" (core, technology, services) as the high-growth / structurally attractive test\n3. Relative share: the #1-or-#2 rule as an operational proxy for relative market share > 1.0\n4. Plot and assign: businesses outside the circles with follower share treated as Dogs\n5. Rebalance cash: divestiture proceeds plus Cash Cow surplus redirected to GE Capital, medical systems, and RCA/NBC\n6. Refresh and self-correct: the 1995 market-redefinition order fixed the narrow-boundary gaming the rule had created\n\nPrimary source: Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. The #1-or-#2 rule, the three-circles framework, the major divestitures and the RCA acquisition, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition are all recounted there and in GE annual reports of the period.\n\nFile v1.0.3:examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md\n\n# Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nP&G's executive team, led by CEO A.G. Lafley, executed the most visible BCG-style portfolio restructuring of the 2000s — publicly framing it in terms nearly identical to the matrix's logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** P&G defined SBUs at brand level across approximately 170 brands spanning home care, personal care, food, and pet products.\n\n**Step 2 — Growth rates:** P&G's internal analysis identified that roughly 65 brands competed in categories with sustained global demand (laundry, baby care, shaving, feminine care); the remainder competed in slower, more fragmented, or declining categories (snack foods, pet care, batteries).\n\n**Step 3 — Relative share:** Within the core 65 brands, P&G held the #1 or #2 position in nearly every category. In the divested brands, relative share was often below 1.0 — the follower position Henderson's framework identifies as the cash-draining condition.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Portfolio action:** Between 2012 and 2016, P&G divested or discontinued approximately 100 brands — including the sale of Pringles to Kellogg's ($2.7B, 2012), the sale of the pet food business, and the divestiture of the Duracell battery brand. Lafley's public rationale: *\"We need to focus on the 70 to 80 brands where we have strong positions in categories that matter to consumers.\"* This is Cash Cow logic applied at scale — extract resources from follower positions in mature markets, reinvest in leader positions in core categories.\n\n**Validation:** Post-restructuring organic sales growth improved from approximately 1% to 4%+. Operating margin increased by roughly 3 percentage points. Market capitalization grew from approximately $200B (2014) to approximately $350B (2021).\n\nPrimary source: A.G. Lafley's investor presentations (2012–2016) and P&G annual reports. The Pringles divestiture price and market share data are from public filings.\n\nFile v1.0.3:skill-card.md\n\n## Description:
\nGuides agents through BCG growth-share portfolio analysis to classify business units, map cash generation and absorption, and recommend invest, harvest, hold, or exit actions.
\n\nThis skill is ready for commercial/non-commercial use.
\n\n## Publisher:
\n[deciqai](https://clawhub.ai/user/deciqai)
\n\n### License/Terms of Use:
\nMIT-0
\n\n\n## Use Case:
\nDevelopers, strategy teams, investors, and board-support agents use this skill to review multi-business portfolios, classify strategic business units, and turn market growth and relative share data into resource-allocation recommendations.
\n\n### Deployment Geography for Use:
\nGlobal
\n\n## Known Risks and Mitigations:
\nRisk: Portfolio recommendations may influence business decisions and should be treated as decision support rather than automatic action.
\nMitigation: Review assumptions, source data, quadrant assignments, and recommendations with qualified stakeholders before acting.
\nRisk: Users may provide confidential business-unit, revenue, or market-share data during analysis.
\nMitigation: Avoid entering sensitive business data unless the agent environment is approved for that information.
\n\n\n## Reference(s):
\n- [BCG Growth-Share Matrix skill page](https://clawhub.ai/deciqai/skills/bcg-matrix)
\n- [Primary sources for BCG growth-share analysis](references/sources.md)
\n- [Procter & Gamble portfolio restructuring example](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md)
\n- [General Electric portfolio pruning example](examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md)
\n- [deciqAI BCG Matrix skill](https://www.deciqai.com/skills/bcg-matrix?utm_source=clawhub&utm_medium=marketplace&utm_campaign=knowledge-skills&utm_content=bcg-matrix)
\n\n\n## Skill Output:
\n**Output Type(s):** [text, markdown, guidance]
\n**Output Format:** [Markdown with structured portfolio map, quadrant assignments, trend notes, and recommendations]
\n**Output Parameters:** [1D]
\n**Other Properties Related to Output:** [May ask step-by-step questions before producing the portfolio map when the user lacks complete business-unit data.]
\n\n## Skill Version(s):
\n1.0.3 (source: server release metadata)
\n\n## Ethical Considerations:
\nUsers should evaluate whether this skill is appropriate for their environment, review any generated or modified files before relying on them, and apply their organization's safety, security, and compliance requirements before deployment.
\n\nArchive v1.0.2: 5 files, 7989 bytes\n\nFiles: examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md (2024b), references/sources.md (1495b), skill-card.md (2777b), SKILL.md (8193b), _meta.json (129b)\n\nFile v1.0.2:SKILL.md\n\n---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: `porters-five-forces` to define industry boundary first · `swot-analysis` for internal-capability depth · `ansoff-matrix` to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self-sufficiency].\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n\n## The Process\n\nProduce a **Portfolio Map** — quadrant assignments, trend arrows, and resource-allocation recommendations per SBU.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Must: serve an identifiable customer group, have identifiable competitors, be manageable with resource independence. Stop rule: if you cannot name the primary competitor, the boundary is wrong.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate.** 2–3 years external data; calculate CAGR. Dividing line: **10%** (raise to 20–30% for AI/clean-tech). Never use own revenue growth as a proxy.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share.** Own share ÷ largest competitor's share. >1.0 = leader; <1.0 = follower.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot.** X-axis: relative share (log, right = high); Y-axis: growth (linear, up = high); bubble size = revenue. Assign quadrant.\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows.** 2-year trajectory per SBU. Trend often matters more than current position.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy.** Star: invest aggressively. Cash Cow: extract surplus; minimize capex. Question Mark: binary — upgrade to Star OR exit by a named date. Dog: harvest/exit; hold only if synergy is named and quantified.\n\n### Output Template\n\n```\nBCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: \n```\n\n*→ Method in Action: [Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md)*\n\n## Portfolio Packs\n\n| Industry | Share proxy | Growth proxy | Dog trap | Star misread |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Consumer packaged goods | Nielsen/IRI retail share | Category CAGR | Legacy brand in declining format | Tiny-base subcategory inflating growth rate |\n| Enterprise SaaS | ARR share vs. ICP rivals | Gartner/IDC forecast | Feature-complete product commoditizing | VC competitor's discount-driven \"growth\" |\n| AI products (2024+) | Monthly active API users vs. nearest rival | Segment TAM growth | Model-wrapper with no defensible moat | Benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path |\n| Retail/e-commerce | GMV share | Segment GMV CAGR | Category with free platform substitute | High-growth vertical with dominant incumbent |\n\n*→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)*\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n**[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.**\n\n| Fake move | Reality |\n|---|---|\n| [D] Using absolute share instead of relative share | A 25%-share firm facing a 40% rival is a follower. Absolute share hides competitive position. |\n| [D] Defining market too broadly to manufacture high relative share | Calling a niche player in \"enterprise software\" a leader obscures the actual threat. |\n| [D] Labeling every Dog as \"strategic\" to avoid exit | Synergy must be quantifiable — name the mechanism and the dollar amount. |\n| [D] Treating the matrix as a one-time exercise | Growth rates and positions shift. Refresh annually at minimum. |\n| [D] Assuming every Question Mark deserves investment | Correct default is a defined decision deadline. Most Question Marks should be exited. |\n| [D] Using BCG to justify a decision already made | If unit definitions are chosen after quadrant destinations are known, the analysis is reverse-engineered. |\n| [D] Applying experience-curve assumption to software or platforms | High share does not mechanically produce low costs in knowledge-intensive businesses. |\n| [D] Treating all Cash Cows as permanent | Cows can become Dogs. Maintain a deterioration watch with leading indicators. |\n| *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Market boundary defined after desired quadrant assignment is known · relative share uses own revenue not competitor's share · all Question Marks described as \"likely Stars\" with no exit criteria · no trend arrows · Dogs retained with unquantified synergy · Cash Cows don't cover Stars + Question Mark investment needs · matrix used as a slide with no reallocation following\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Each SBU passes the standalone-manager test (identifiable market, rivals, separable P&L)\n- [ ] Relative share = own share ÷ largest competitor's share (not absolute share)\n- [ ] Market growth from external data, not own revenue growth\n- [ ] 2-year trend arrows plotted for each SBU\n- [ ] Cash Cow generation quantified against Star + Question Mark investment needs\n- [ ] Each Dog has an exit plan or a named, quantified synergy\n- [ ] Each Question Mark has a decision deadline with invest-or-exit criteria\n- [ ] Refresh cadence scheduled (state the date)\n\n---\n\n*Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — 163 open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. The same skills power every deciqAI agent, which runs them autonomously to operate your company. **See it run → https://www.deciqai.com/skills/bcg-matrix?utm_source=clawhub&utm_medium=marketplace&utm_campaign=knowledge-skills&utm_content=bcg-matrix** · ⭐ Star the repo → https://github.com/deciqAI/knowledge-skills · Contributions welcome.*\n\nFile v1.0.2:_meta.json\n\n{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.2\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1783471147409\n}\n\nFile v1.0.2:references/sources.md\n\n# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here.\n\nFile v1.0.2:examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md\n\n# Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nP&G's executive team, led by CEO A.G. Lafley, executed the most visible BCG-style portfolio restructuring of the 2000s — publicly framing it in terms nearly identical to the matrix's logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** P&G defined SBUs at brand level across approximately 170 brands spanning home care, personal care, food, and pet products.\n\n**Step 2 — Growth rates:** P&G's internal analysis identified that roughly 65 brands competed in categories with sustained global demand (laundry, baby care, shaving, feminine care); the remainder competed in slower, more fragmented, or declining categories (snack foods, pet care, batteries).\n\n**Step 3 — Relative share:** Within the core 65 brands, P&G held the #1 or #2 position in nearly every category. In the divested brands, relative share was often below 1.0 — the follower position Henderson's framework identifies as the cash-draining condition.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Portfolio action:** Between 2012 and 2016, P&G divested or discontinued approximately 100 brands — including the sale of Pringles to Kellogg's ($2.7B, 2012), the sale of the pet food business, and the divestiture of the Duracell battery brand. Lafley's public rationale: *\"We need to focus on the 70 to 80 brands where we have strong positions in categories that matter to consumers.\"* This is Cash Cow logic applied at scale — extract resources from follower positions in mature markets, reinvest in leader positions in core categories.\n\n**Validation:** Post-restructuring organic sales growth improved from approximately 1% to 4%+. Operating margin increased by roughly 3 percentage points. Market capitalization grew from approximately $200B (2014) to approximately $350B (2021).\n\nPrimary source: A.G. Lafley's investor presentations (2012–2016) and P&G annual reports. The Pringles divestiture price and market share data are from public filings.\n\nFile v1.0.2:skill-card.md\n\n## Description:
\nMaps business units on a growth-share matrix to identify cash generators, cash absorbers, investment candidates, and units to harvest or exit.
\n\nThis skill is ready for commercial/non-commercial use.
\n\n## Publisher:
\n[deciqai](https://clawhub.ai/user/deciqai)
\n\n### License/Terms of Use:
\nMIT-0
\n\n\n## Use Case:
\nEmployees, consultants, investors, and strategy teams use this skill to review multi-unit portfolios, classify business units by market growth and relative share, and produce resource-allocation recommendations.
\n\n### Deployment Geography for Use:
\nGlobal
\n\n## Known Risks and Mitigations:
\nRisk: Portfolio recommendations may be mistaken for authoritative financial or investment advice.
\nMitigation: Review company-specific assumptions, source links, and recommendations before using outputs for budget, investment, divestiture, or board decisions.
\nRisk: Incorrect market boundaries, growth rates, or competitor share data can misclassify business units.
\nMitigation: Require identifiable competitors, external growth data, relative-share calculations, trend arrows, and explicit decision deadlines before acting on the matrix.
\n\n\n## Reference(s):
\n- [Sources - bcg-matrix](references/sources.md)
\n- [Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012-2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md)
\n- [BCG: The Product Portfolio](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio)
\n- [BCG: The Experience Curve Reviewed](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history)
\n- [Seeger: Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix](https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108)
\n- [Hambrick, MacMillan, and Day: Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix](https://doi.org/10.2307/256079)
\n- [Procter & Gamble Annual Reports](https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/)
\n- [ClawHub listing](https://clawhub.ai/deciqai/skills/bcg-matrix)
\n\n\n## Skill Output:
\n**Output Type(s):** [text, markdown, guidance]
\n**Output Format:** [Markdown portfolio map with tables, trend notes, and recommendations]
\n**Output Parameters:** [1D]
\n**Other Properties Related to Output:** [May include a step-by-step coaching flow when the user lacks complete business-unit data.]
\n\n## Skill Version(s):
\n1.0.2 (source: server release evidence)
\n\n## Ethical Considerations:
\nUsers should evaluate whether this skill is appropriate for their environment, review any generated or modified files before relying on them, and apply their organization's safety, security, and compliance requirements before deployment.
\n\nArchive v1.0.1: 5 files, 7899 bytes\n\nFiles: examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md (2024b), references/sources.md (1495b), skill-card.md (2767b), SKILL.md (8038b), _meta.json (129b)\n\nFile v1.0.1:SKILL.md\n\n---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: [`porters-five-forces`](../porters-five-forces/SKILL.md) to define industry boundary first · [`swot-analysis`](../swot-analysis/SKILL.md) for internal-capability depth · [`ansoff-matrix`](../ansoff-matrix/SKILL.md) to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self-sufficiency].\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n\n## The Process\n\nProduce a **Portfolio Map** — quadrant assignments, trend arrows, and resource-allocation recommendations per SBU.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Must: serve an identifiable customer group, have identifiable competitors, be manageable with resource independence. Stop rule: if you cannot name the primary competitor, the boundary is wrong.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate.** 2–3 years external data; calculate CAGR. Dividing line: **10%** (raise to 20–30% for AI/clean-tech). Never use own revenue growth as a proxy.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share.** Own share ÷ largest competitor's share. >1.0 = leader; <1.0 = follower.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot.** X-axis: relative share (log, right = high); Y-axis: growth (linear, up = high); bubble size = revenue. Assign quadrant.\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows.** 2-year trajectory per SBU. Trend often matters more than current position.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy.** Star: invest aggressively. Cash Cow: extract surplus; minimize capex. Question Mark: binary — upgrade to Star OR exit by a named date. Dog: harvest/exit; hold only if synergy is named and quantified.\n\n### Output Template\n\n```\nBCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: \n```\n\n*→ Method in Action: [Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md)*\n\n## Portfolio Packs\n\n| Industry | Share proxy | Growth proxy | Dog trap | Star misread |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Consumer packaged goods | Nielsen/IRI retail share | Category CAGR | Legacy brand in declining format | Tiny-base subcategory inflating growth rate |\n| Enterprise SaaS | ARR share vs. ICP rivals | Gartner/IDC forecast | Feature-complete product commoditizing | VC competitor's discount-driven \"growth\" |\n| AI products (2024+) | Monthly active API users vs. nearest rival | Segment TAM growth | Model-wrapper with no defensible moat | Benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path |\n| Retail/e-commerce | GMV share | Segment GMV CAGR | Category with free platform substitute | High-growth vertical with dominant incumbent |\n\n*→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)*\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n**[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.**\n\n| Fake move | Reality |\n|---|---|\n| [D] Using absolute share instead of relative share | A 25%-share firm facing a 40% rival is a follower. Absolute share hides competitive position. |\n| [D] Defining market too broadly to manufacture high relative share | Calling a niche player in \"enterprise software\" a leader obscures the actual threat. |\n| [D] Labeling every Dog as \"strategic\" to avoid exit | Synergy must be quantifiable — name the mechanism and the dollar amount. |\n| [D] Treating the matrix as a one-time exercise | Growth rates and positions shift. Refresh annually at minimum. |\n| [D] Assuming every Question Mark deserves investment | Correct default is a defined decision deadline. Most Question Marks should be exited. |\n| [D] Using BCG to justify a decision already made | If unit definitions are chosen after quadrant destinations are known, the analysis is reverse-engineered. |\n| [D] Applying experience-curve assumption to software or platforms | High share does not mechanically produce low costs in knowledge-intensive businesses. |\n| [D] Treating all Cash Cows as permanent | Cows can become Dogs. Maintain a deterioration watch with leading indicators. |\n| *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Market boundary defined after desired quadrant assignment is known · relative share uses own revenue not competitor's share · all Question Marks described as \"likely Stars\" with no exit criteria · no trend arrows · Dogs retained with unquantified synergy · Cash Cows don't cover Stars + Question Mark investment needs · matrix used as a slide with no reallocation following\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Each SBU passes the standalone-manager test (identifiable market, rivals, separable P&L)\n- [ ] Relative share = own share ÷ largest competitor's share (not absolute share)\n- [ ] Market growth from external data, not own revenue growth\n- [ ] 2-year trend arrows plotted for each SBU\n- [ ] Cash Cow generation quantified against Star + Question Mark investment needs\n- [ ] Each Dog has an exit plan or a named, quantified synergy\n- [ ] Each Question Mark has a decision deadline with invest-or-exit criteria\n- [ ] Refresh cadence scheduled (state the date)\n\n---\n\n*Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. Built by deciqAI · https://deciqai.com · Contributions welcome — see the template at the repo root.*\n\nFile v1.0.1:_meta.json\n\n{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.1\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1783456202776\n}\n\nFile v1.0.1:references/sources.md\n\n# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here.\n\nFile v1.0.1:examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md\n\n# Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nP&G's executive team, led by CEO A.G. Lafley, executed the most visible BCG-style portfolio restructuring of the 2000s — publicly framing it in terms nearly identical to the matrix's logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** P&G defined SBUs at brand level across approximately 170 brands spanning home care, personal care, food, and pet products.\n\n**Step 2 — Growth rates:** P&G's internal analysis identified that roughly 65 brands competed in categories with sustained global demand (laundry, baby care, shaving, feminine care); the remainder competed in slower, more fragmented, or declining categories (snack foods, pet care, batteries).\n\n**Step 3 — Relative share:** Within the core 65 brands, P&G held the #1 or #2 position in nearly every category. In the divested brands, relative share was often below 1.0 — the follower position Henderson's framework identifies as the cash-draining condition.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Portfolio action:** Between 2012 and 2016, P&G divested or discontinued approximately 100 brands — including the sale of Pringles to Kellogg's ($2.7B, 2012), the sale of the pet food business, and the divestiture of the Duracell battery brand. Lafley's public rationale: *\"We need to focus on the 70 to 80 brands where we have strong positions in categories that matter to consumers.\"* This is Cash Cow logic applied at scale — extract resources from follower positions in mature markets, reinvest in leader positions in core categories.\n\n**Validation:** Post-restructuring organic sales growth improved from approximately 1% to 4%+. Operating margin increased by roughly 3 percentage points. Market capitalization grew from approximately $200B (2014) to approximately $350B (2021).\n\nPrimary source: A.G. Lafley's investor presentations (2012–2016) and P&G annual reports. The Pringles divestiture price and market share data are from public filings.\n\nFile v1.0.1:skill-card.md\n\n## Description:
\nGuides agents through BCG Growth-Share Matrix portfolio analysis to classify business units by market growth and relative market share, then produce resource-allocation recommendations.
\n\nThis skill is ready for commercial/non-commercial use.
\n\n## Publisher:
\n[deciqai](https://clawhub.ai/user/deciqai)
\n\n### License/Terms of Use:
\nMIT-0
\n\n\n## Use Case:
\nStrategy teams, investors, board advisors, and agents supporting portfolio reviews use this skill to map business units into Stars, Cash Cows, Question Marks, and Dogs and turn the map into investment, harvest, or exit recommendations.
\n\n### Deployment Geography for Use:
\nGlobal
\n\n## Known Risks and Mitigations:
\nRisk: The skill can produce misleading portfolio guidance if market growth, competitor share, or business-unit boundaries are inaccurate.
\nMitigation: Validate market data, relative share calculations, and standalone business-unit definitions with current external sources and human business review before acting.
\nRisk: The output may be treated as a substitute for financial diligence or executive judgment.
\nMitigation: Use the analysis as strategic guidance only and review recommendations with finance, strategy, and accountable decision makers before reallocating capital.
\n\n\n## Reference(s):
\n- [BCG Product Portfolio](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio)
\n- [BCG Experience Curve Reviewed](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history)
\n- [Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix](https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108)
\n- [Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix](https://doi.org/10.2307/256079)
\n- [Procter & Gamble Annual Reports](https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/)
\n- [Skill Sources](references/sources.md)
\n- [P&G Portfolio Restructuring Example](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md)
\n\n\n## Skill Output:
\n**Output Type(s):** [Analysis, Markdown, Guidance]
\n**Output Format:** [Markdown portfolio map with tabular business-unit analysis and recommendations]
\n**Output Parameters:** [1D]
\n**Other Properties Related to Output:** [May include quadrant assignments, trend arrows, cash generator and absorber summaries, strategy actions, and decision deadlines.]
\n\n## Skill Version(s):
\n1.0.1 (source: server release evidence)
\n\n## Ethical Considerations:
\nUsers should evaluate whether this skill is appropriate for their environment, review any generated or modified files before relying on them, and apply their organization's safety, security, and compliance requirements before deployment.
\n\nArchive v1.0.0: 5 files, 7882 bytes\n\nFiles: examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md (2024b), references/sources.md (1495b), skill-card.md (2717b), SKILL.md (8038b), _meta.json (129b)\n\nFile v1.0.0:SKILL.md\n\n---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: [`porters-five-forces`](../porters-five-forces/SKILL.md) to define industry boundary first · [`swot-analysis`](../swot-analysis/SKILL.md) for internal-capability depth · [`ansoff-matrix`](../ansoff-matrix/SKILL.md) to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self-sufficiency].\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n\n## The Process\n\nProduce a **Portfolio Map** — quadrant assignments, trend arrows, and resource-allocation recommendations per SBU.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Must: serve an identifiable customer group, have identifiable competitors, be manageable with resource independence. Stop rule: if you cannot name the primary competitor, the boundary is wrong.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate.** 2–3 years external data; calculate CAGR. Dividing line: **10%** (raise to 20–30% for AI/clean-tech). Never use own revenue growth as a proxy.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share.** Own share ÷ largest competitor's share. >1.0 = leader; <1.0 = follower.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot.** X-axis: relative share (log, right = high); Y-axis: growth (linear, up = high); bubble size = revenue. Assign quadrant.\n\n**Step 5 — Trend arrows.** 2-year trajectory per SBU. Trend often matters more than current position.\n\n**Step 6 — Strategy.** Star: invest aggressively. Cash Cow: extract surplus; minimize capex. Question Mark: binary — upgrade to Star OR exit by a named date. Dog: harvest/exit; hold only if synergy is named and quantified.\n\n### Output Template\n\n```\nBCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: \n```\n\n*→ Method in Action: [Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)](examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md)*\n\n## Portfolio Packs\n\n| Industry | Share proxy | Growth proxy | Dog trap | Star misread |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Consumer packaged goods | Nielsen/IRI retail share | Category CAGR | Legacy brand in declining format | Tiny-base subcategory inflating growth rate |\n| Enterprise SaaS | ARR share vs. ICP rivals | Gartner/IDC forecast | Feature-complete product commoditizing | VC competitor's discount-driven \"growth\" |\n| AI products (2024+) | Monthly active API users vs. nearest rival | Segment TAM growth | Model-wrapper with no defensible moat | Benchmark-topping product with no enterprise path |\n| Retail/e-commerce | GMV share | Segment GMV CAGR | Category with free platform substitute | High-growth vertical with dominant incumbent |\n\n*→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)*\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n**[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.**\n\n| Fake move | Reality |\n|---|---|\n| [D] Using absolute share instead of relative share | A 25%-share firm facing a 40% rival is a follower. Absolute share hides competitive position. |\n| [D] Defining market too broadly to manufacture high relative share | Calling a niche player in \"enterprise software\" a leader obscures the actual threat. |\n| [D] Labeling every Dog as \"strategic\" to avoid exit | Synergy must be quantifiable — name the mechanism and the dollar amount. |\n| [D] Treating the matrix as a one-time exercise | Growth rates and positions shift. Refresh annually at minimum. |\n| [D] Assuming every Question Mark deserves investment | Correct default is a defined decision deadline. Most Question Marks should be exited. |\n| [D] Using BCG to justify a decision already made | If unit definitions are chosen after quadrant destinations are known, the analysis is reverse-engineered. |\n| [D] Applying experience-curve assumption to software or platforms | High share does not mechanically produce low costs in knowledge-intensive businesses. |\n| [D] Treating all Cash Cows as permanent | Cows can become Dogs. Maintain a deterioration watch with leading indicators. |\n| *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Market boundary defined after desired quadrant assignment is known · relative share uses own revenue not competitor's share · all Question Marks described as \"likely Stars\" with no exit criteria · no trend arrows · Dogs retained with unquantified synergy · Cash Cows don't cover Stars + Question Mark investment needs · matrix used as a slide with no reallocation following\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Each SBU passes the standalone-manager test (identifiable market, rivals, separable P&L)\n- [ ] Relative share = own share ÷ largest competitor's share (not absolute share)\n- [ ] Market growth from external data, not own revenue growth\n- [ ] 2-year trend arrows plotted for each SBU\n- [ ] Cash Cow generation quantified against Star + Question Mark investment needs\n- [ ] Each Dog has an exit plan or a named, quantified synergy\n- [ ] Each Question Mark has a decision deadline with invest-or-exit criteria\n- [ ] Refresh cadence scheduled (state the date)\n\n---\n\n*Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. Built by deciqAI · https://deciqai.com · Contributions welcome — see the template at the repo root.*\n\nFile v1.0.0:_meta.json\n\n{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1782458243194\n}\n\nFile v1.0.0:references/sources.md\n\n# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here.\n\nFile v1.0.0:examples/procter-gamble-brand-portfolio-restructuring-2012-2016.md\n\n# Method in Action: Procter & Gamble's Brand Portfolio Restructuring (2012–2016)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nP&G's executive team, led by CEO A.G. Lafley, executed the most visible BCG-style portfolio restructuring of the 2000s — publicly framing it in terms nearly identical to the matrix's logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** P&G defined SBUs at brand level across approximately 170 brands spanning home care, personal care, food, and pet products.\n\n**Step 2 — Growth rates:** P&G's internal analysis identified that roughly 65 brands competed in categories with sustained global demand (laundry, baby care, shaving, feminine care); the remainder competed in slower, more fragmented, or declining categories (snack foods, pet care, batteries).\n\n**Step 3 — Relative share:** Within the core 65 brands, P&G held the #1 or #2 position in nearly every category. In the divested brands, relative share was often below 1.0 — the follower position Henderson's framework identifies as the cash-draining condition.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Portfolio action:** Between 2012 and 2016, P&G divested or discontinued approximately 100 brands — including the sale of Pringles to Kellogg's ($2.7B, 2012), the sale of the pet food business, and the divestiture of the Duracell battery brand. Lafley's public rationale: *\"We need to focus on the 70 to 80 brands where we have strong positions in categories that matter to consumers.\"* This is Cash Cow logic applied at scale — extract resources from follower positions in mature markets, reinvest in leader positions in core categories.\n\n**Validation:** Post-restructuring organic sales growth improved from approximately 1% to 4%+. Operating margin increased by roughly 3 percentage points. Market capitalization grew from approximately $200B (2014) to approximately $350B (2021).\n\nPrimary source: A.G. Lafley's investor presentations (2012–2016) and P&G annual reports. The Pringles divestiture price and market share data are from public filings.\n\nFile v1.0.0:skill-card.md\n\n## Description:
\nHelps agents guide business portfolio reviews using the BCG growth-share matrix to classify strategic business units by market growth and relative market share and recommend invest, harvest, or exit actions.
\n\nThis skill is ready for commercial/non-commercial use.
\n\n## Publisher:
\n[deciqai](https://clawhub.ai/user/deciqai)
\n\n### License/Terms of Use:
\nMIT-0
\n\n\n## Use Case:
\nEmployees, external consultants, and strategy teams use this skill to prioritize business units, brands, or portfolio holdings that compete for shared capital. It supports annual strategy reviews, budget allocation, board discussions, PE/VC portfolio reviews, and M&A retain-versus-divest decisions.
\n\n### Deployment Geography for Use:
\nGlobal
\n\n## Known Risks and Mitigations:
\nRisk: Users may disclose confidential revenue, market-share, competitor, or business-unit data while using the skill.
\nMitigation: Use the skill only in an agent environment trusted for the sensitivity of the business information being analyzed.
\nRisk: Portfolio recommendations can be misleading if market boundaries, competitor share, growth data, or retained-unit synergies are not verified.
\nMitigation: Validate SBU definitions, external growth data, relative share calculations, trend arrows, and quantified synergies before acting on recommendations.
\n\n\n## Reference(s):
\n- [Sources - bcg-matrix](references/sources.md)
\n- [The Product Portfolio](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio)
\n- [The Experience Curve Reviewed](https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history)
\n- [Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix](https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108)
\n- [Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix](https://doi.org/10.2307/256079)
\n- [Procter & Gamble Annual Reports](https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/)
\n\n\n## Skill Output:
\n**Output Type(s):** [text, markdown, guidance]
\n**Output Format:** [Markdown analysis with tables, portfolio map fields, trend notes, and recommendations]
\n**Output Parameters:** [1D]
\n**Other Properties Related to Output:** [May include quadrant assignments, trend arrows, cash generator and absorber summaries, and dated strategy decisions.]
\n\n## Skill Version(s):
\n1.0.0 (source: server release evidence)
\n\n## Ethical Considerations:
\nUsers should evaluate whether this skill is appropriate for their environment, review any generated or modified files before relying on them, and apply their organization's safety, security, and compliance requirements before deployment.
","readmeExcerpt":"Skill: BCG Growth-Share Matrix Owner: deciqai Summary: Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\" \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation ac... Tags: latest:1.0.6 Version history: v1.0.6 | 2026-07-16T17:52:44.547Z | user Description tail link + agents machine-readable metadata line (deciqai.com/s/bcg-matrix.json) v1.0.5 | 2026-07-09T11:15:42.623Z","codeSnippets":[],"executableExamples":[{"language":"text","snippet":"BCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: "},{"language":"text","snippet":"BCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: "},{"language":"text","snippet":"BCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: "},{"language":"text","snippet":"BCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: "},{"language":"text","snippet":"BCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: "},{"language":"text","snippet":"BCG Portfolio Map: | Threshold: % | Date: \nSBU | Growth | Rel.Share | Quadrant | Revenue | Profitable?\nTrend: moving → — reason: <…>\nCash generators: | Cash absorbers: | Balance: \nStrategy: : invest/harvest/exit by \nKey decision: "}],"parameters":null,"dependencies":[],"permissions":[],"extractedFiles":[{"path":"SKILL.md","content":"---\nname: bcg-matrix\ndescription: >\n Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\"\n \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation across units\"; firm has multiple business\n units competing for shared capital; investor or board discussion needs a visual portfolio health read.\n Do NOT activate when: firm is a single-product startup with no portfolio to balance; user needs\n competitive analysis within one market (use Porter's Five Forces or VRIO instead).\n More: deciqai.com/c/bcg-matrix\n---\n\n# BCG Growth-Share Matrix\n\n## Overview\n\nMaps each business unit on a 2×2 grid of market growth rate vs. relative market share, revealing which units generate cash, which absorb it, and which to invest in, harvest, or exit. Four quadrants: **Stars** (invest), **Cash Cows** (harvest), **Question Marks** (binary decide), **Dogs** (exit or hold minimally). Rests on two empirical anchors: experience curve (high share = lowest cost) and industry life cycle (high growth demands reinvestment; maturity throws off cash).\n\nComposes with: `porters-five-forces` to define industry boundary first · `swot-analysis` for internal-capability depth · `ansoff-matrix` to set growth direction for units worth investing in.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Firm operates **≥ 3 distinct business units** competing for a shared capital pool\n- Annual **strategy or budget reviews** need a forcing function for prioritization\n- **PE/VC portfolio** requires a quick health-read across holdings; M&A teams assessing retain vs. divest\n- **AI capital reallocation:** deciding which units to harvest to fund AI capex / AI-native bets, and whether an AI unit is a true Star or an expensive Question Mark amid AI-native competition\n\n**When NOT to use:** single-product startup · highly interdependent units where divesting a Dog may destroy a Cash Cow · market in technology transition with unreliable growth data · firm-level competitive analysis within one market\n\n## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door)\n\n- **Engine mode:** user has specific BU data → run The Process directly.\n- **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step.\n\nIn Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.\n\n1. BCG shows which businesses fund others, which burn cash, and which need a decision — using two numbers: market growth rate and your share relative to your biggest competitor.\n2. Check fit: does the user have multiple distinct units? If single-product, redirect to Ansoff or Five Forces.\n3. Ask: \"Which business units are you trying to prioritize?\"\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n4. Walk through unit definition, data collection, quadrant plotting, trend analysis, and strategy assignment one step at a time.\n> **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]**\n5. Close: \"The key thing BCG just revealed is [which unit is your implicit funder and which is consuming it without a clear path to self"},{"path":"_meta.json","content":"{\n \"ownerId\": \"kn754b8sk22s8c6gjxt02bftbn88q7ye\",\n \"slug\": \"bcg-matrix\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.6\",\n \"publishedAt\": 1784224364547\n}"},{"path":"references/sources.md","content":"# Sources — bcg-matrix\n\n> *Primary sources for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\n- Henderson, B.D. (1970). \"The Product Portfolio.\" *BCG Perspectives* #66. Boston Consulting Group. The founding document. Verbatim quote above is from this source. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1970/strategy-the-product-portfolio\n- Henderson, B.D. (1973). \"The Experience Curve Reviewed.\" *BCG Perspectives* #124. Boston Consulting Group. The underlying empirical pillar of the matrix. https://www.bcg.com/publications/1973/experience-curve-reviewed-history\n- Seeger, J.A. (1984). \"Reversing the Images of BCG's Growth/Share Matrix.\" *Strategic Management Journal*, 5(1), 93-97. The primary academic critique showing the matrix's empirical limits. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050108\n- Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I.C., & Day, D.L. (1982). \"Strategic Attributes and Performance in the BCG Matrix.\" *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(3), 510-531. Empirical test of matrix predictions against actual business unit performance. https://doi.org/10.2307/256079\n- Procter & Gamble Annual Reports (2012–2016) and investor day materials. Primary source for the P&G worked example. https://pginvestor.com/financial-information/annual-reports/\n- Welch, J., with Byrne, J.A. (2001). *Jack: Straight from the Gut*. New York: Warner Business Books. Primary source for the GE worked example — the #1-or-#2 \"fix, sell, or close\" rule, the three-circles framework, and the 1995 below-10%-share market redefinition.\n- Microsoft Corporation. Forms 10-K (FY2024, FY2025) and quarterly earnings releases. Primary source for the 2024–2026 AI-capital-reallocation example — three-segment structure (Productivity & Business Processes, Intelligent Cloud, More Personal Computing), Azure growth, and AI capital-expenditure guidance. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor\n- Cloud-infrastructure market-share and growth trackers (e.g., Synergy Research Group, Canalys) as reported through 2025. Context for the relative-share axis (AWS leader, Azure #2, Google Cloud follower) in the Microsoft example. Used as directional market-share context, not as precise-figure evidence.\n\nNot cited and why: Malcolm Gladwell-style \"David vs. Goliath\" portfolio parables — vivid but not primary-source documented. Pop-business references to \"kill your darlings\" or similar attributed-but-unverified management aphorisms are not used as evidence here."},{"path":"examples/general-electric-fix-sell-or-close-portfolio-pruning-1981-1995.md","content":"# Method in Action: General Electric's \"Fix, Sell, or Close\" Portfolio Pruning (1981–1995)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nWhen Jack Welch became CEO in April 1981, General Electric was the archetypal diversified conglomerate: dozens of strategic business units — a structure GE itself had pioneered in its 1970 reorganization — spanning lighting, appliances, motors, power systems, aerospace, mining, housewares, and consumer electronics. The company was profitable in aggregate, but shared capital was spread across hundreds of product lines regardless of competitive position. Welch's response was an operational enactment of growth-share portfolio logic.\n\n**Step 1 — SBU definition:** GE's existing SBU structure already passed the standalone-manager test — each unit had an identifiable market, named competitors, and a separable P&L. This made the portfolio immediately mappable.\n\n**Steps 2–3 — The two axes, collapsed into a rule:** Welch compressed the matrix's two dimensions into a single test. The relative-share axis became the famous rule that every business must be **#1 or #2 in its market** — leadership in Henderson's relative-share sense — or be fixed, sold, or closed. The growth axis became his \"three circles\" sketch of 1983: only businesses inside the circles of **core manufacturing, technology, and services** — the sectors GE judged to have structural growth or defensible economics — earned a claim on capital. A business outside the circles with a follower share was, in matrix terms, a Dog.\n\n**Steps 4–6 — Quadrant actions and cash rebalancing:**\n\n- **Dogs and weak Question Marks — exit.** GE sold the housewares business to Black & Decker (1984), divested Utah International's mining operations (1984), exited air conditioning, and in 1987 traded its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France in exchange for Thomson's medical-imaging business — swapping a follower position in a brutal market for added share in a business where GE led. Headcount fell by well over 100,000 during the 1980s through divestiture and restructuring, earning Welch the \"Neutron Jack\" nickname.\n- **Cash Cows — harvest.** Mature leaders such as lighting, motors, and major appliances were run for cash with disciplined capital expenditure rather than growth investment.\n- **Stars and promoted Question Marks — invest.** Divestiture proceeds and Cash Cow surplus funded aggressive investment in GE Capital, medical systems, and plastics, and financed the $6.3 billion acquisition of RCA (1986), which brought NBC into the portfolio.\n\n**Validation:** GE's market capitalization grew from roughly $13 billion in 1981 to over $400 billion by Welch's retirement in 2001 — for a period, the most valuable company in the world.\n\n**The built-in critique (1995):** The case also documents the matrix's classic failure mode. Welch recounts in his memoir that by the mid-1990s, managers had learned to game the #1-or-#2 rule by defining their markets narrowly enough to c"},{"path":"examples/microsoft-ai-capital-reallocation-portfolio-2024-2026.md","content":"# Method in Action: Microsoft's Product Portfolio as AI Reallocates Capital (2024–2026)\n\n> *Example for the [bcg-matrix](../SKILL.md) skill.*\n\nBy 2024–2026, Microsoft had become the clearest large-cap case of a diversified technology portfolio being re-mapped by the AI capital cycle. The strategic question was not \"are we in AI\" but a portfolio question the growth-share matrix is built for: **which mature units throw off enough cash to fund a historically large AI capex build-out, which AI bets are genuine Stars versus expensive Question Marks, and which legacy units are quietly slipping toward Dog status.** This example applies the skill's process to Microsoft's reported segment structure as of early 2026. Figures are drawn from Microsoft's public segment reporting and widely-reported disclosures; where an exact number is uncertain it is qualified or omitted.\n\n**Step 1 — Define SBUs.** Microsoft reports three segments, each passing the standalone-manager test (identifiable customers, named rivals, separable P&L):\n- **Productivity & Business Processes** — Microsoft 365 / Office, Copilot for M365, LinkedIn, Dynamics. Rivals: Google Workspace, Salesforce.\n- **Intelligent Cloud** — Azure and server products. Rival: AWS (leader), Google Cloud (follower).\n- **More Personal Computing** — Windows, devices (Surface), search/advertising (Bing), and gaming (Xbox / Activision Blizzard). Rivals vary by line: Apple, Sony/Nintendo, Google.\n\nFor AI-specific reads we also treat **Azure AI / Copilot** as an emerging unit-within-a-unit, because it is where the capital and the competitive fight are concentrated.\n\n**Step 2 — Market growth rate (threshold raised to ~20% for cloud/AI).** Following the skill's rule to raise the dividing line for AI-adjacent markets: public cloud infrastructure was reported growing at roughly 20%-or-more annually through this period, and the generative-AI segment faster off a smaller base. Mature PC software (Windows, Office seat growth) and console gaming grew in the low single digits — clearly *below* the line. Never use Microsoft's own revenue growth as the proxy; the axis is external market CAGR.\n\n**Step 3 — Relative market share (own share ÷ largest rival's share).**\n- **Azure:** the reported #2 in cloud infrastructure behind AWS, so relative share is **below 1.0** — a follower that had been reported gaining share.\n- **Microsoft 365 / Office:** dominant in paid enterprise productivity, relative share **well above 1.0** — a leader.\n- **Windows:** dominant in desktop OS, relative share **above 1.0**, but in a flat-to-declining market.\n- **Search (Bing):** relative share far **below 1.0** against Google — a structural follower.\n- **Gaming:** a strong #2/#3 in consoles; leadership contested.\n\n**Step 4 — Plot and assign quadrants.**\n\n| SBU | Market growth | Relative share | Quadrant |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Azure (incl. AI services) | High (>20%) | <1.0 vs. AWS | **Star** (high-growth follower reported gaining on the leader; classic Star t"}],"languages":[],"docsSourceLabel":"CLAWHUB","editorialOverview":"Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\" \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation ac... Skill: BCG Growth-Share Matrix Owner: deciqai Summary: Activate when: user says \"portfolio review,\" \"cash cow,\" \"Stars and Dogs,\" \"growth-share matrix,\" \"which business should we fund,\" or \"resource allocation ac... 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